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Summary 
 
Social assistance is a large and fiscally costly component of anti-poverty policy in South 
Africa and therefore lends to the questions: Are the grants effective tools for reducing 
poverty in South Africa and, moreover, how significant is their impact on poverty? As a 
measure of reducing poverty and improving the non-social indicators of the poor, the 
government has expanded the social grants since the advent of the new democracy. The 
country‟s social grant system is advanced and covers a broad range of individuals, as it is 
intended to cover vulnerable individuals over their life course from childhood to adulthood 
and into old age. Policy discourse surrounding the grants centres on the sustainability of the 
system and their implications for development. It is therefore important that their 
significance is shown and that their impact is illustrated by highlighting their reach into 
severely poor households. As a measure of poverty alleviation on their own, the grants are 
not enough and South Africa‟s poverty alleviation strategy has to rest primarily on economic 
growth and job creation. In addition, there are significant challenges in the system, such as 
the fact that there is no poverty grant targeted specifically at the unemployed; consequently, 
too much strain is placed on the resources of grant-receiving households that the whole 
household is plunged into poverty. Accordingly, the question this raises is: How can 
government solve the problem of the poor clustering around these grants? This dissertation 
will systematically show that the use of social security as a poverty-alleviating tool is 
effective given the extent of poverty in South Africa and the limitations on resources. It will 
also show that the decision-making structures in households influence the way grants affect 
the resource allocation needed for achieving lower levels of poverty. The extent to which the 
cash transferred to poor households via the grant programmes reduces poverty is likely to be 
influenced significantly by the decision-making structures in the grant-receiving households. 
There is evidence that grant money is shared in extended households, which suggests that 
decision making is broadly unitary or cooperative. However, we can only observe the 
outcomes and not the decision-making process in this regard and therefore can only draw 
tentative conclusions. Although there is cause for concern regarding the propensity of social 
grants to affect people‟s behaviour negatively, there is a case to be made for retaining grants 
as an important, though not the only, form of anti-poverty strategy.  This highlights the need 
for continued research on the labour market and the social grants causal relationship. It also 
shows that research into the fertility effects of the grants is wanting, especially if there are 
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speculative concerns that might inform policy on the impact of CSG on fertility.  
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Opsomming 
Sosiale bystand is „n groot en duur fiskale komponent van anti-armoede verligtingsbeleid in 
Suid Afrika en lei daarom tot die vrae: Is die toelaes effektiewe instrumente om armoede te 
verlig in Suid Afrika, en nog meer, hoe noemenswaardig is hulle impak op armoede? As „n 
maatstaf om armoede te verlig en die nie-sosiale armoede- aanwysers te verbeter van die 
armes, het die regering die  sosiale toelaes vermeerder sedert die aanvang van demokrasie. 
Die land se sosiale toelae stelsel is gevorderd en dek „n wye verskeidenheid  groepe van 
individue, aangesien dit bedoel is om weerlose individue te dek vanaf kind tot volwassene 
deurlopend tot die bejaarde. Beleidsdiskoers om die toelaes fokus op die  volhoubaarheid van 
die stelsel en die  implikasies daarvan vir ontwikkeling. Dit is daarom van belang dat die 
belangrikheid hiervan uitgewys word en die impak daarvan geillustreer word, deur op  hul 
trefkrag te fokus in die armste van huishoudings. As „n middel to armoedeverligting op 
sigself is toelaes nie voldoende nie, en Suid-Afrika se armoede verligtingstrategie moet 
hoofsaaklik  lê in werkskepping en ekonomiese groei. Verder is daar belangrike uitdagings in 
die stelsel, soos byvoorbeeld die feit dat daar geen  armoede toelaes spesifiek gemik op die 
werkloses is nie; „n gevolg hiervan is dat daar te veel druk geplaas word op die bronne van 
die huishoudings wat toelaes ontvang en dat die hele huishouding in armoede gedompel 
word. Gevolglik ontstaan die vraag: Hoe kan die regering die probleem oplos van 
konsentrering van die armes rondom die toelaes? Hierdie dissertasie sal sistematies wys dat 
die gebruik van sosiale sekuriteit as „n armoede- verligtingsbeleid is effektiek gegewe die 
omvangreikheid van armoede in Suid Afrika en die beperkings op bronne. Dit sal ook wys 
dat die besluitnemingstrukture in huishoudings  beinvloed die manier  waarop toelaes die 
bron-allokasie beinvloed om laer vlakke van armoede te bereik. Die vlak waartoe die kontant  
oordraging na die arm huishoudings via die toelaes die vlak van armoede verlig word in alle 
waarskynlikheid tot „n groot mate beinvloed deur die besluitnemingstrukture in sodanige 
huishoudings wat toelaes ontvang. Daar is bewyse dat die toelaes gedeel word in uitgebreide 
huishoudings, wat daarop aandui dat besluitneming breedweg unitêr geneem  word of 
gesamentlik. Ons kan egter slegs die uitkomste en nie die besluitnemingsproses in die 
verband bespeur nie en kan daarom slegs tot tentatiewe gevolgtrekkings kom. Alhoewel daar 
wel rede to kommer is vir die geneigdheid van toelaes om mense se gedrag negatief te 
beinvloed, is waar wel „n saak om toelaes te behou, hoewel nie as die enigste, maar wel as „n 
belangrike vorm van armoedeverligting. Dit lê die klem op die nodigheid van deurlopende 
navorsing op die arbeidsmark en die toelae- oorsaaklikheidsverhouding. Dit wys ook dat 
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navorsing op die vrugbaarheidseffek van die toelaes is nodig, veral as daar spekulatiewe 
besorgdheid is wat die beleid op die impak van kindertoelaes op fertiliteit mag beinvloed. 
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1. Introduction  
 
1.1 Background  
 
As a developing country, South Africa‟s development profile shows certain contradictions. 
On the one hand, the country has a per capita income commensurate with other developing 
countries, yet, on the other, some of its non-income social indicators have lagged behind 
those of comparable countries. As a measure of reducing poverty and improving the non-
social indicators of the poor, the government has expanded the social grants since the advent 
of the new democracy. The country‟s social grant system1 is advanced and covers a broad 
range of individuals, as it is intended to cover vulnerable individuals over their life course 
from childhood to adulthood and into old age.  
 
From its inception, the social assistance system has been a key aspect of anti-poverty policy 
in South Africa. When the old age pension, was first introduced, it was intended to cover a 
small margin of poor whites; however, today it has been transformed into a poverty grant that 
reaches more than just targeted elderly people. Today, South African grants reach 27% of the 
population and amount to approximately R90 billion, that is, 3.5% of GDP in 2009. The 
signs are that the nominal growth of grant spending will be likely to continue.  
 
1.2 Research question 
 
Social assistance is a large and fiscally costly component of anti-poverty policy and therefore 
the questions is: Are the grants effective tools for reducing poverty in South Africa and, 
moreover, how significant is their impact on poverty?  
 
Accordingly to the 2005 Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) (StatsSA, 2005), South 
Africa‟s poverty rate is 47%. There are certain elements about South Africa‟s poverty that 
are pervasive, including the high incidence among women, children, black households and 
elderly people. Markers of poverty, such as type of dwelling, show that there is a great 
                                                 
1
 Although South Africa has both social insurance and social assistance, this dissertation focuses on the social  
assistance system. The social insurance system provides conditional income support and consists of three 
compulsory contributory social security funds: the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF), the Compensation 
Fund and the Road Accident Fund. The social assistant system, on the other hand, provides non-contributory 
assistance to qualifying individuals and it exists alongside the social insurance system.  
14 
 
prevalence of rural poverty and the poor have less access to basic services. Are the grants, in 
particular the old age grant and the child support grant
2
, reaching these types of household, 
and are they lifting them out of poverty or pushing them closer to the poverty line?  
 
In light of the above, this dissertation attempts to answer the afore-mentioned questions. In 
order to do so, this dissertation will systematically show that the use of social security as a 
poverty-alleviating tool is effective given the extent of poverty in South Africa and the 
limitations on resources. It will also show that the decision-making structures in households 
influence the way grants affect the resource allocation needed for achieving lower levels of 
poverty.  
 
1.3 Delineation and limitations 
 
The literature on poverty and social grants is vast and cannot be covered in its entirety in this 
dissertation. For instance, HIV/Aids has changed the dynamics within the household and 
there are many inferences that could be made about the impact of HIV/Aids which are also 
central to the developmental challenges in the country. Although fully aware of its possible 
impact, this dissertation does not elaborate on the impact of HIV/Aids in households or on 
the children left destitute owing to the death of parents.  
 
Although cognisant of the role of grants in poverty alleviation and the gap that still exists in 
terms of the unemployed being not fully covered, this dissertation will not venture into this 
aspect of the social assistance system. The discourse surrounding the Basic Income Grant 
(BIG) which debates the issue of the unemployed poor (see van der Berg, 2002; Samson, 
2002; Bhorat 2002) is extensive. The Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) was 
implemented as an alternative policy initiative to the BIG. Van der Berg and Siebrits (2010) 
analyse the role that the EPWP is playing in creating employment.  
 
This thesis is a positive analysis that evaluates what government is already doing in terms of 
its anti-poverty policy making use of the social grants, particularly the old age pension and 
the child support grant, because of their huge uptake, which, between the two, encompasses 
85% of social grant beneficiaries.      
                                                 
2
 The dissertation focuses on these two main grants for the analysis, as their beneficiaries constitute 85% of 
grant recipients in the country. Social grants are discussed in greater detail in chapter 4. 
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1.4 The relevance of the study to policy  
 
The overarching theme of van der Berg and Siebrits‟s (2010) paper „Social assistance reform 
in the time of fiscal stress‟ aptly captures the importance of evaluating the anti-poverty 
strategy. These authors ask whether the social grants, as a major element of anti-poverty 
strategy in South Africa, are worth keeping at a time of fiscal stress, bearing in mind that 
they command a sizeable percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP); moreover, would 
it be better to allocate these resources elsewhere?  
 
Policy discourse surrounding the grants centres on the sustainability of the system and their 
implications for development. It is therefore important that their significance is shown and 
that their impact is illustrated by highlighting their reach into severely poor households. As a 
measure of poverty alleviation on their own, the grants are not enough and South Africa‟s 
poverty alleviation strategy has to rest primarily on economic growth and job creation (van 
der Berg and Siebrits, 2010). In addition, there are significant challenges in the system, such 
as the fact that there is no poverty grant targeted specifically at the unemployed; 
consequently, too much strain is placed on the resources of grant-receiving households that 
the whole household is plunged into poverty. Accordingly, the question this raises is: How 
can government solve the problem of the poor clustering around these grants? Perhaps there 
is no immediate solution. 
 
1.5 Research methodology 
 
In this study, the methodology that was applied was intended to help substantiate the claim 
that social grants have an impact in the alleviation of poverty. In this dissertation, the 
research design differs from that used in a pure literature review and a purely empirically 
based dissertation. Since there is a great deal of literature on the role of social grants in 
poverty alleviation and on household theory, this work has drawn much from it. Therefore, 
this work cannot be classified as a pure literature review, nor is it a purely empirical work; 
instead it takes the middle ground by reviewing literature and using an own data analysis to 
either reiterate previous findings or to elicit new findings through empirical work. The 
advantage of this method is that it roots the arguments put forward by the thesis in existing 
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literature, while simultaneously advancing the debate on the impact of grants in poverty 
alleviation. The thesis concludes that government should be cognisant of how the grants enter 
households and the relative bargaining positions of each member of the household in terms of 
the grant. The outline of the chapters is briefly discussed below.  
 
1.6 Chapter outline  
 
Chapter 2 
 
Much of the analysis carried out in this thesis relies on understanding the allocation of 
resources by a household using household theory. Household theory holds that the allocation 
of resources and therefore the alleviation of poverty in households has much to do with the 
decision-making structure. Using such a theoretical underpinning, the thesis assumes that 
there are elements that effect decision making and the allocation of resources within the 
household; these include headship, perception of self-worth by members of the household 
and the identity of the person for whom the grant is intended. There are two competing 
schools of thought in this debate: the neoclassical model and the collective bargaining model. 
These are explored in this chapter. The outcomes of both of these models have significant 
implications for the way in which resources enter households, and the results of these 
outcomes can only be observed using wellbeing indicators.  
 
Chapter 3 
 
Chapter 3 contextualises poverty because there must be a clear understanding of the problem 
that social grants are aimed at eradicating. This section draws on debates about what it means 
to be poor with a discussion on poverty measures and contending views of the definition of 
poverty. Halving poverty by the year 2014 is a Millennium Development Goal and, as a 
result, much has been written about it, emphasising yet again the multidimensionality of 
poverty. The multidimensionality view supposes that being poor reaches far beyond income-
based measures and advocates that non-income measures, such as access to running water, be 
considered when evaluating poverty. This is contextualised for South Africa by comparing its 
development to that of other developing countries such as the BRIC
3
 (Brazil, Russia, India 
                                                 
3
 BRIC countries are a group of fast developing countries, marked by a high growth rate. South Africa has been 
recently added as a member of this group, making it BRICS. 
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and China) countries, the Latin American countries and countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
What becomes evident from this comparison is the fact that South Africa still faces human 
development challenges that impede the eradication of poverty. Building on the 
multidimensionality comparison of South Africa and other developing countries, Section 3.5 
creates a poverty profile of South Africa which looks at the rates of poverty among races, 
provinces and dwelling areas. In this section, the most important issue is understanding the 
kinds of households that experience poverty and thus where policy instruments such as the 
grants should be targeted.  
 
Chapter 4 
 
Chapter 4 outlines the social security system of South Africa from its early phases. A 
historical perspective is necessary to sketch the context within which such grants have 
assumed a wider role of not only supporting the intended beneficiaries but other poor people 
living with them. One of the key decisions made at the peak of apartheid was the extension of 
this anti-poverty instrument to African households. The historical overview also highlights 
the ambivalence with which the apartheid government approached poverty alleviation, the 
consequences of which are still being felt by the new democracy. These consequences 
include not dealing with the major issues of unemployment and the lack of skills in the 
majority of the population. This chapter also describes the current social grant system, giving 
the magnitude and scope of reach of the social grants. One unresolved issue is still the 
unemployed and the structurally unskilled individuals whom the government has not been 
able to deal with successfully in the long term. Consequently, there have been proposals for a 
basic income grant, which the government has rejected. Instead, the government has opted to 
expand the public works programme. 
 
Chapter 5 
 
In order to answer the research question of whether the grants are effective in alleviating 
poverty, this chapter draws on a variety of methods to tackle the question from various angles 
using a combination of literature and data analysis. In particular, the data analysis attempts to 
measure what the levels of poverty would be without the grants and to show that the grants 
are effective in two areas: 1) in lifting individuals closer to the poverty line or over it; and 2) 
in targeting households in severe poverty.  
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The section on the descriptive bivariate analysis increases understanding of the kind of 
households that receive the grants. This is done by analysing reported hunger in households 
that receive both the old age pension (OAP) and the child support grant (CSG). The results 
attained help in understanding resource allocation in these households, such as reported 
hunger in children versus reported hunger in adults in pension-receiving households. These 
results also allude to the decision-making structure in the household .This is elaborated 
further by looking at developmental effects such as the labour market and the implications of 
fertility.  
 
Chapter 6  
 
Chapter 6 is a basic overview of the impact of grants on poverty alleviation in South Africa 
and what the household models reveal about decision making in such households. It is a 
summary of policy implications for government in terms of what it needs to be cognisant of 
when making decisions regarding the social security going into households. No concrete 
results were obtained from National Treasury on whether the grants should have explicit 
conditions of the kind widely used in Latin America and elsewhere. This dissertation makes 
conclusions that government should be cognisant with in terms of the way grants enter 
households and the relative bargaining positions of each member of the household. 
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2. Decision making and the allocation of resources within 
households: implications for unearned income 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The objective of this dissertation is to analyse the role that social grants play in alleviating 
poverty. Households matter for this purpose because they are the most essential unit of 
society; they distribute resources between members of the household and, as a unit, are 
important decision makers in society.  
 
The chapter will analyse the discourse in terms of the unitary model and the collective 
bargaining model of households in the allocation of unearned income, such as the social 
grants in South Africa. The unitary and cooperative bargaining models are used as theoretical 
instruments for attempting to explain decision making in terms of the allocation of resources 
in households. Decision-making structures in households and the dynamics attached to them 
affect both decisions pertaining to the household participation in society and individual 
welfare. In addition, they affect the way in which unearned income, such as the social grants, 
enters the household and influence decisions about the distribution of resources between their 
members. In addition to its influence on social grants, the decision-making structure of the 
household effectively influences the way a household participates in society as a whole, such 
as its members‟ participation in the labour market, as well as how it affects individual 
welfare, the amount of education an individual can obtain and an individual‟s health status.  
Both models are informative about the way a household decides on its distribution of 
resources among individuals in the household. The reason for looking at both models is to 
relate them to social grants and the way grants enter the household as unearned income, as 
well as the impact they have on decision making and resource allocation – particularly with 
regard to whether the targeted grants reach the intended recipient.  
 
Various factors affect the allocation of resources, including the gender of the household head 
and the targeted recipient of the grant.  
 
To understand how grants can be fully maximised in poverty alleviation, we must define a 
household within the South African context. The section that follows gives a definition of a 
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household and the theoretical underpinnings of the unitary model of household resource 
maximisation, following which the issue of home production is analysed. There are various 
issues with the unitary model that warrant attention, such as the household head, the gender 
dynamics of the household and the allocation of resources. Subsequent to analysing the 
unitary model, the collective models are analysed. In this section, the Nash bargaining 
framework is used to determine the optimal outcome of resource sharing in households. This 
outcome is influenced by many factors such as the fallback position of each member and the 
environment they are in. Both models are applied to the issue of unearned income in the 
household, and the chapter ends with a conclusion. 
 
2.2 Defining a household 
 
A household is a basic unit of society in which the activities of reproduction, production, and 
consumption and the socialisation of children take place (Roberts 1991, cited in Wheelock 
and Oughton, 2001:116). The household has been considered as both a consumption and 
production structure (Becker, 1973; Edmonds, Mammen and Miller, 2004). Members of the 
household share common resources and derive utility from being part of a household rather 
than being on their own (Himmelweit, 2001:144). The household is an important 
intermediary between aggregate policies, local programmes and individual welfare 
(Rosenzweig, 1986:233). The effectiveness of individually targeted policy depends on the 
understanding of the dynamics within the household. The analytical challenge concerning the 
household arises because interaction between its members cannot be observed; it is only the 
outcomes that can be measured in the form of human capital indicators and other indicators 
such as consumption patterns.  
 
The definition of household membership has significant implications for research outcomes 
when assessing the way social policy affects households.
4
 This is especially relevant in South 
Africa‟s case where the conventional nuclear family is often not present and there are as 
many as four generations living in the same household (Dinkelman, 2004). The question of 
who is included as part of a household is important. Accordingly, there are statistical 
conventions that establish the parameters that influence the way a household is defined in 
                                                 
4
 The analysis of this issue is dealt with in the chapter on the various social grants and their impact on the 
labour market.  
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research, which may not be a true reflection of household formation patterns in the case of 
South Africa.  
 
Consequently, there is a strict definition and a broad definition of household formation, 
which define membership in terms of physical presence and resource sharing respectively 
(Posel, Fairburn and Lund, 2006). The strict residency rule stipulates that, in order to be 
counted as part of that household, a person must have been a resident of the household for the 
greater part of the year. This rule avoids double counting individuals who may be members 
of more than one household. It also minimises reporting errors during consensus because 
people are more likely to remember details about people they see on a daily basis than about 
those who have only been present in the household for a short period in a year (Posel et al, 
2006:838). On the other hand, the broad rule accommodates members who are home for at 
least fifteen days in a year. This rule realistically reflects South Africa‟s complex household 
structures, as such households are dynamic and influenced by economic factors such as the 
proximity of place of employment and migration labour. Many migrant labourers retain their 
membership in the household through remittance wages and those who are male retain their 
headship and often make key decisions in the household. The definition of what the 
household is is important because it states who forms part of the household and who does 
not, which influences decision making. In the case of South Africa, a person who is not there 
all the time may still play an important role in making decisions, for example the migrant 
labourer. So when policy looks at who makes the decisions, it is important to keep such 
dynamics in mind.  
 
This dissertation takes cognisance of the fact that households can be complex and can be 
according to the broad and the strict definitions. In the sections that follow, an analysis of the 
household decision-making models will be carried out, bearing in mind the implications they 
may hold for the decision-making processes of South African households. The unitary model 
endeavours to explain the “black box”, that is, the household, by applying individual utility 
maximisation theory.  
 
 
 
2.3  The major principles of unitary models 
 
22 
 
Household economics came out of the periphery into mainstream economics when 
economists such as Reid (1934), Samuelson (1956), Becker (1965; 1971) and Folbre (1982; 
1984; 1985) showed an interest in the household as an important unit of decision making. 
Before this, the household was not given much thought although it was acknowledged to be 
an influential decision-making entity; “truly a „small factory‟ that combines capital goods, 
raw material and labour to clean, feed, procreate and otherwise produce useful commodities” 
(Becker, 1965:496). This extended to the understanding that individuals do not just allocate 
their time between paid work and leisure, but that there are also unpaid productive activities 
that compete for time (Himmelweit, 2001; Wheelock and Oughton, 2001:115). This became 
known as new household economics (NHE). Samuelson (1956) and Becker (1965) began 
using neoclassical theory to explain an apparent contradiction in the economy; that is, the 
increase in the employment of women even though real income was also increasing.
5
 This 
was in contrast to neoclassical theory, which predicts that people would consume more 
leisure time than do more work (Wheelock and Oughton, 2001:116). 
  
The unitary model views a household as comprising members with individual preferences, 
heterogeneous tastes and noticeable decentralisation of decision making with respect to some 
functions of the household (Samuelson, 1956:9). However, the household finds ways to act 
together as an entity. In his common preference model, Samuelson (1956) takes cognisance 
of the contending and conflicting preferences of members of the household, and proposes a 
method for dealing with these conflicts; that is, either by modelling a household according to 
one person‟s preferences (the household head), assuming that a household has identical 
homothetic utility function, or by aggregating it according to some sharing formula that 
assigns individual worth. Alternatively, the family reaches a bargained compromised family 
consensus or a “meeting of the minds” about the outcomes of welfare in the household 
(Samuelson, 1956:9). A decentralisation of decision making within the household, which 
eventually conforms to a common preference model, is reached when each person‟s utility, 
tastes and marginal rates of substitution are affected by the welfare of others (Samuelson, 
1956:10). And, since “blood is thicker than water”, the preferences of the different members 
are interrelated by consensus and the family acts as if it were maximising joint welfare 
(Samuelson, 1956). Subsequently, a set of well-behaved indifference curves relating the 
                                                 
5
 Increase in real wages is assumed to buy the household more home time; therefore there should not have been 
a need for an increase in the employment of women.  
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totals of what a family consumes can be derived for the whole family. A family could thus be 
said to act as if it maximises such a group preference (Samuelson, 1956:21).  
 
2.4 Application of the neoclassical model’s labour supply decisions when 
unearned income is received 
 
Figure 2.1 below depicts the unitary model of households which assumes that the household 
is a single utility-maximising entity. As in consumer theory, the household acts as a utility-
maximising individual whose indifference curves and utility are homothetic and identical for 
all members of the household. Members of the household decide how much time to allocate 
to market and non-economic goods, as well as how much of each is purchased.  
 
In the past, household utility models did not differentiate the time that is spent at home 
because there are many activities that compete for this, such as child care, cooking, cleaning, 
and leisure (Wheelock and Oughton, 2001:117). Here, the term “home time” is used which 
encompasses the different ways in which the household allocates its collective time at home. 
The household utility function is represented by the indifference curves C and D subject to 
the budget constraint, which is its income. Unearned income, yo, is not affected by how a 
household decides to spend its time between home and market. This is income such as rent 
and social grants. The budget line, ZQ, shows the possible income for households at a given 
wage rate. This gives the desired combination of home time and income. The initial position 
of the household is on budget line ZQ and indifference curve C. Here the households 
maximise utility where the indifference curve and budget line intercept at point B, allocating 
tmax-t1 hours to labour market activity and earning y1. 
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Figure 2.1: Household allocation of time between home time and the labour market  
 
 
 
           
 
 
 
 
     0    to                        t1      t2                                         tmax 
  tmax Hours of market labour     0 
0  Hours of home time    tmax 
Source: Wheelock and Oughton (2001) 
 
Given unearned income, yo, that is not influenced by the household‟s decision to participate 
in the labour force, the household will maximise utility at point A along the budget line ZR. 
The household provides tmax-t2 labour and uses to-t2 for home time. The availability of yo, 
enables the household to maintain the same level of income, y1, and to spend less time in the 
labour market. At point B, the household spends more time in the labour market with the 
absence of yo. The household could, however, decide to earn a higher income at y2 and keep 
the time allocated to the labour market the same at t1. Unearned income broadens the 
available choices for a household. It can enable members of the household to migrate in 
search of employment by providing financial support to the individual; alternatively, a 
household can decide to consume more home time by allowing members to engage in more 
“home” activities rather than labour market activities.  
 
The household‟s labour supply curve is derived from a change in the wage rate. Based on this 
wage rate, the household will decide how much labour to supply the market and how much to 
keep for home time use. The opportunity cost of home time is the income forgone by 
consuming an extra hour of home time; therefore, a rise in the wage rate makes home time 
more expensive to consume, because the household will have to give up a higher income to 
stay at home (Wheelock and Oughton, 2001). This model assumes readily available work and 
does not consider imperfections in the labour market such as unemployment. How the 
household reacts to changes in the wage rate will depend on what kind of goods home time 
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and income are. The actual effect of a change in the wage rate will depend on the income and 
substitution effects of the change: if home time is an inferior good, the household will 
consume less of it given a rise in the wage rate (see Wheelock and Oughton, 2001:120). We 
therefore cannot draw firm conclusions about how households will react to changes in the 
wage rate or how they will use unearned income. Much of their choice will depend on the 
kind of home-produced goods it wants to consume.   
 
2.5 Household decisions on the consumption of home-produced goods in 
terms of the unitary model 
 
The household produces z-goods, which are products of home time and income from the 
labour market such as a better standard of living, from which they derive utility using a 
combination of market goods and home time used as inputs (Wheelock and Oughton, 
2001:121). Hence, home production can be devoted to things such as child care. It may be 
the case that poor households have to spend t0-tmax of their time in the labour market to meet 
their needs, assuming that the initial level of income for the poor is low and that the 
subsequent wages are also minimal because of the lack of skilled human capital among the 
poor. For that reason, even though they increase the amount of time at work, there is a wage 
ceiling imposed by their lack of skills. The value of tmax will depend on the number of people 
in the household; in this case for a two-people model it is 48 hours. yo will increase the 
choices of inputs the household can purchase for home production and allows them to 
consume at a higher level of income. The availability of unearned income for poor families 
allows them to consume bundles of z goods at a higher indifference curve; they can either 
decide to take on more income (by participating more in the labour market) or more home 
time. Consumption at the high level point A is utility maximising for the whole household; 
however, there are differing views about how these home-produced goods should be 
allocated to members of the household.  
 
2.6 The major criticism of the unitary model 
 
2.6.1. The role of the household head in the unitary model 
 
Samuelson (1965) suggests that a household could be represented by a common preference 
model because members care about what others consume: each member sacrifices for the 
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greater utility of the household and thus would allocate the basket of goods cognisant of each 
other‟s needs. Becker‟s (1971) criticism of this model is that it is not consistent with 
neoclassical individual utility maximisation theory and that the preferences of a household 
are determined by a household head. Accordingly, the household head‟s utility is 
interdependent on the welfare of the other members of his or her household. The benevolent 
household head, who is altruistic towards other members, gets more utility from seeing other 
members of his household better off. The altruism of the household head is still consistent 
with neoclassical theory because he/she maximises his/her own utility by considering the 
consumption of the other members. His/her utility is maximised by sharing out gains and 
losses among the whole family. If the head punishes an individual who acts selfishly by 
reducing his or her welfare, he is simply following his own preferences which include 
concern for the welfare of all members (Himmelweit, 2001:151). In this model, there is no 
possibility of disagreement about household utility because it is determined by one person 
who happens to be an altruist. Having an altruistic head, however, does not mean that 
resources are distributed fairly (Himmelweit, 2001; Doss, 1996). The notion of the altruistic 
household head only requires that he doles out enough altruism to keep other members of his 
household dependent on him, that the utility of what they receive from his altruism 
marginally exceeds what they can hope to achieve on their own (Himmelweit, 2001; 
Rosenzweig, 1986). This gives us insight into the inequality within households and the 
different poverty rates experienced by members. Alderman, Chiappori, Haddad and Kanbur 
(1995:3) are critical of the unitary model because the unequal distribution of resources may 
be considered efficient by the household and the altruism takes place under restrictive 
assumptions (Alderman et al, 1995:3). 
 
There is also, of course, the non-benevolent household head who acts selfishly and whose 
individual utility is not interlinked with that of his household. Black (2004:429) extends the 
idea of a “rotten kid”, where a child acts selfishly by cooperating in the household because he 
knows his future depends on the altruistic (Becker, 1974; 1991), to argue that some South 
African household heads are the “rotten parent”. A rotten parent acts selfishly and has the 
decision-making power to exercise his selfish preferences (Wittenberg, 2001:14; Black, 
2004:249). Black (2004) specifically considers the problem of a “rotten male parent” whose 
preference is centred on the consumption of tobacco and alcohol – a pattern of behaviour that 
is quite common among male household heads in Africa (Kennedy and Haddad, 1994). 
Because he is the sole distributor of resources in the household, the rotten parent can allocate 
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income to his vices, while the consumption of other goods such as health and education 
decreases (Simister and Piesse, 2002). What may entrench this type of behaviour is that the 
household head is the sole breadwinner. Public policy targeted at alleviating poverty within 
the household must take account of the power dynamics therein. Social grants, for example, 
may not reach the intended persons. If the targeting happens through a woman, she should 
not only bring in the money, but should also have control over the allocation of resources if 
the rotten parent is a man. If this household head is benevolent, then the grant reaches the 
targeted person along with all members of the household, although this does not imply the 
equitability of the distribution. The household may hold its own perceptions of what an 
equitable distribution is.  
 
The dictator household head must have control over the resources in order to enforce their 
redistribution. Such control could result from financial means or some society-held belief 
about their inherent right to lead (Doss, 1996:1598). However, it could also be enforced 
through violence, which is the opposite of the altruistic household head. In these situations, 
members of the household could leave and start another household or join a household 
elsewhere. However, there are at least two reasons why some members may be unable to 
leave such an abusive household. Firstly, all members who form a household derive a higher 
utility by being part of a household than being on their own (Himmelweit, 2001:144). 
Secondly, some members may not be in an economic or social position to leave such a 
household. The lack of employment or cultural and religious beliefs may prohibit a person 
from leaving. The implication this has for public policy targeting individuals within the 
household is that the nature of the interaction between members of the household or the 
disposition of the household head either mitigates or enhances the effectiveness of public 
transfers (Alderman et al, 1995:8). Public policy that is intended to optimally affect 
household allocation of resources may need to be aware of a household‟s taste for 
discrimination or equalisation, depending on its endowments (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 
1982; Behrman, 1988).  
 
2.6.2 Gender dynamics in a unitary household model 
 
Becker‟s work on family allocation of resources in 1956 broadly inferred that gender 
participation in the household, in terms of the production of z goods, affects the way in which 
welfare is allocated between its members. Resource allocation between members in the 
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household has a gender dynamic. In Becker‟s (1956) model, men have a comparative 
advantage in market work and, conversely, women have a comparative advantage in 
household work. And since the family allocates resources to children on the basis of future 
returns, girl children are likely to be allocated fewer resources since market work has an 
elevated status in the household (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982:803). A utility maximising 
household will consider its preferences and allocate intra-household resources accordingly. 
Considering its welfare both present and in the future, it may decide to invest most of its 
resources in individuals who will increase its welfare (Behrman, 1988; Rosenzweig and 
Schultz, 1982). Because of labour market returns to different individuals of certain genetic 
make-up, usually defined by sex, a household may decide to invest in the individual who 
would maximise its utility both in the present and future (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982; 
Pitt, Rosenzweig and Hassan, 1990). This was particularly evident in studies on welfare 
allocation in poor communities in India, which found that girls received fewer household 
benefits compared to boys, as males had inherent traits such as strength that enabled 
marginally higher labour market returns (Sen, 1990; Pitt et al, 1990; Berhman, 1988; 
Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982). Therefore, parents invested in males because of the sex 
differences in expected income opportunities of boys and girls as adults (Rosenzweig and 
Schultz, 1982). The hypothesis by Pitt et al (1990:1141) is that the distribution of work 
activity within the household affects the allocation of resources among its members, with 
males being rewarded for energy-intensive work where their health status may affect their 
productivity. There are differences in the allocation of resources between male and female in 
the Indian households researched by Pitt et al (1990). For instance, a poverty alleviation 
policy targeted at reaching the poor in the household may have to overcompensate and take 
cognisance of that fact, although this could be region specific.  
 
In accordance with Pitt et al‟s (1990) hypothesis, household work such as raising children 
and cooking is allocated little to no weight as a contribution to household consumption. It is 
usually the responsibility of women and is, consequently, less valuable compared to income. 
Financial contributions to the household hold more weight than domestic chores (Becker, 
1956). Because of the comparative advantage of girls in the household and males in the 
labour market, path dependence is created, as girls become better suited for household work 
than boys. In the long run, girls become women whose contribution to the household is 
valued less than that of men owing to the fact that housework is regarded as inferior to the 
financial contribution made by men. Furthermore, since the household rewards financial 
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contributions more than housework, this becomes reflective of the treatment of human capital 
of women versus men. A household invests more resources such as food and education in the 
individual who brings in financial income (Rosenzweig, 1986; Pitt et al, 1990; Wheelock and 
Oughton, 2001). This supposed comparative advantage for men in the labour market and 
women in the home entrenches biases in the different way human capital is invested for boys 
and girls. This has labour market consequences for women since fewer employment 
opportunities exist for them (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982). When resources in the 
household are scarce, the household makes the decision to invest in individuals who bring 
resources into the household, sacrificing the caloric intake of the other members (Pitt et al, 
1990).  
 
Folbre (1986:251) criticises the limitations of the unitary model decision-making process by 
noting that most women and children are not in a position to negotiate their welfare because 
of cultural and societal beliefs about their worth; hence, they become compromised in the 
process. Sen (1990) has also commented on self-perception in the context of household 
dynamics; that is, self-worth determines a person‟s negotiating position. However, this is 
explored further in the section on collective bargaining models.  
 
Whatever the case, different findings have emerged about targeted public policy (such as 
unearned income) in gender dynamics in terms of decision making and the allocation of 
resources within the household, especially in developing countries such as South Africa and 
those in Latin America (Thomas, 1990; Attanasio and Lechene, 2002; Duflo, 2003; Case, 
Hosegood and Lund, 2005; Ward-Batts, 2008; Posel et al, 2004). The unitary model implies 
that resources should reach members of the household in the same manner as they would 
without the cash transfer. Therefore, the identity of the individual receiving the cash transfer 
is of no relevance; the cash transfer will in any case increase the general welfare of 
individuals. However, this is hardly the case in South Africa (Thomas, 1990; Duflo, 2003; 
Aguero, Carter and Woolard, 2007). Research has revealed that the identity of the receiver of 
the cash transfer does matter. When the decision making is in the hands of women, the 
general welfare of children is improved especially that of the girl child (Thomas, 1990; 
Duflo, 2003). There is also strong gender favouritism of male to male and female to female 
when it comes to resource allocation in the home (Thomas, 1990; Attanasio and Lechene, 
2002). Hence, policy makers need to be aware of the co-dependence of family members and 
how policy may augment welfare in the household (Rosenzweig, 1986: 240). Although the 
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unitary model is important in simplistic analysis, collective models allow for the exploration 
of the dynamics that influence decision making; they do not treat the household as a unit with 
common preferences but consider individual choices and bargaining power.   
 
One good point of the unitary model is that if policy blindly targets a person within a 
household, the household rearranges itself in such as way that that person ends up with the 
same outcomes as before. This does not mean that the individual gets the state welfare and 
their share of household allocated goods; what it means is that the household finds a way of 
rebalancing itself, cancelling out the intended effect of the policy measure. Because of this, 
individual targeting may not have the intended effect; however, the limitations of the unitary 
model are in that once the income is in the household, it is redistributed according to 
common preferences regardless of the identity of the social welfare recipient. However, an 
analysis of the OAP and the CSG in South Africa illustrates that this simply cannot be the 
case, these grants show that resource distribution within the household is a bargained 
outcome.  
 
2.7 Overview of the major principles of the collective bargaining models 
2.7.1 Theoretical underpinning of collective bargaining models 
 
There is a wide selection of models that disaggregate the household utility function. 
Chiappori (1988, 1992) was one of the first economists to develop a framework of collective 
models, in terms of which the household was no longer viewed as a “black box”. He aimed to 
reveal the internal rules and distribution processes of households by observing their 
behaviour using labour supply or aggregate consumption (Chiappori, 1992:439). In contrast 
to the neoclassical framework, collective models allow the data to describe the decision rule 
within the household. What was observed of the household at that time was its interaction 
with the outside world, but little was known about its internal decision-making method. 
Bourguignon and Chiappori (1992) also further developed the household decision-making 
structure through bargained income. 
 
The risk with regard to the conventional neoclassical model of aggregating household 
welfare is the potentially misleading policy outcomes with regard to individual welfare 
within the household; in particular, the prediction that income reaches all individuals in the 
household equally. There is neither rationale nor evidence for the notion that the allocation of 
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resources is equal within the household. Thus, Chiappori (1988; 1992) assumes a sharing rule 
that governs the allocation of resources within households. This sharing rule does not imply 
equity but simply how the household distributes its resources. The sharing rule rests on four 
assumptions, namely: 1) that some goods are private: 2) that preferences are altruistic; 3) that 
each member‟s sub-utility function is separable with respect to private consumption; and 4) 
that there is an assignable private good (Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene, 
1994). The collective model will always achieve the altruistic outcomes of the unitary model 
through these rules; therefore, the unitary model is sometimes viewed as a special case of 
collective models under strict assumptions (Doss, 1996:1599). Collective models explicitly 
answer the question of how individual preferences lead to a collective choice (Alderman et 
al, 1995:5). These models are broadly divided into cooperative and non-cooperative 
bargained outcomes.  
 
In cooperative bargaining models, decision making is modelled by a cooperative Nash 
game
6
. McElroy and Horney (1981:334) formulate a bargaining framework between two 
individuals in a marriage, who maximise individual utility from consuming a “household 
good” which is defined as a pure public good within the household. The consumption of this 
public good by one individual does not reduce the amount available to the other individual. 
The authors divide the individual‟s time into market work and leisure time, which is time not 
spent at market work. Thus, total expenditure in the household is on the pure public good, 
own goods which are consumed by the (individual), and on leisure (McElroy and Horney 
1981:336); income in this model is pooled. These individuals then solve a Nash bargaining 
problem in which each individual‟s threat point is their utility outside of marriage; this is the 
utility a person would get at the dissolution of the marriage (Doss, 1996: 1600).
7
  
 
Further work on the cooperative bargaining models incorporates parameters that will 
influence and shift a person‟s threat point (McElroy, 1990). These are external household 
environmental parameters (EEPs), such as institutional, demographic and legal factors, which 
are outside the marriage but would affect the member‟s bargaining power within the 
household (Doss, 1996:1600). Although these threat points within the marriage may not be 
                                                 
6
 A cooperative Nash bargaining payoff is the outcome from bargaining that maximizes the player’s gain from 
cooperation. 
7
 Divorce is specific to a married couple household; however, there are various kinds of households that do 
not conform to the nuclear family that would also have their own threat points, some similar to a married 
couple such as legal recourse in the dissolution of the household.  
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carried out, they affect the distribution of resources within the household (Doss, 1996). The 
outcomes of the cooperative bargaining models are Pareto efficient.  
 
Unlike the cooperative bargaining models, the non-cooperative model assumes that resources 
such as income are not pooled. Individuals in a household make independent but interrelated 
consumption and production decisions (Doss, 1996:1600). The bargaining process in non-
cooperative models determines the amount each person spends on public and private goods 
within the households. Each person maximises their own individual welfare taking as given 
the expected action of the other person using a Cournot-Nash
8
 bargaining framework. Their 
consumption includes the aggregate level of the household goods provided by partners, 
personal consumption and leisure. Contribution to household welfare by two utility 
maximising individuals is determined by some socially sanctioned norms for the division of 
responsibilities – what Lindberg and Pollak (1993) call separate spheres. Each partner will 
make their decision regarding the household appropriate to that sphere. An example of this is 
where a woman provides housekeeping and the husband provides income. The section below 
describes decision making in terms of the non-cooperative and cooperative models. 
 
2.7.2 The Nash collective bargaining model 
 
Nash bargaining models use game theory to model household decisions, the outcomes of 
which can be cooperative or non-cooperative. Both partners maximise their own utility by 
taking the utility maximising decision of the other partner as a given and maximising their 
own utility independently of the other‟s preferences. The model below is adapted from 
Himmelweit (2001) and is of a husband and wife. Each makes his/her decision of utility 
maximising following their preferences alone. It is assumed that the husband brings income 
to the household and the wife provides „home care‟. The domestic standard is the public 
good produced by the household, which is consumed by both husband and wife. Even though 
they consume domestic standard they also value the consumption of private goods.   
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 A Cournot Nash game is a static game where all players have complete information about the game including 
information about other player’s possible strategies and payoffs. Therefore each player maximizes utility 
cognizant of the other player. 
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Table 2.1: Household decision making in the collective bargaining model 
 
Husband 
Spends only his own choice 
amount of money  
Husband 
Spends a larger amount of 
money on the household 
Wife 
Spends own choice 
amount of time in 
household 
Non-cooperative equilibrium 
Where a standard is reached 
without cooperation  
Not a possible equilibrium, 
husband contributes to domestic 
standard more than the wife  
Wife  
Spends a larger 
amount of time on the 
household  
Not a possible equilibrium, the 
wife contributes to domestic 
standard more than the 
husband 
The cooperative equilibrium 
outcome, preferred by both 
partners 
Source: Himmelweit (2001) 
 
The husband contributes an amount of money to the household and the wife contributes 
domestic work. Each has strategies that they could possibly put into play. Both of them 
assume that the other person‟s preferences are given and they therefore maximise their own 
utility given the outcomes of the other member‟s preferences.  
 
There are two possible equilibriums, one of which is non-cooperative. At this equilibrium, 
both the husband and the wife decide on of the basis of how much of their personal resources 
they will spend on the household. Although both partners have much to gain from 
cooperating, they maximise according to their own preferences, which leads them both to a 
less than efficient solution. Both will choose their own preference and settle into this way of 
life (Himmelweit, 2001:154). At this equilibrium no member wants to make the sacrifice of 
giving more of their resources to produce domestic goods. The husband will not give any 
more money towards the household and the wife will not spend any more time on 
housekeeping. It thus becomes too costly for one individual to invest in improving the 
domestic standard of living, because the opportunity cost is too high (Himmelweit, 2001). 
When each member chooses his or her own preference over that of the household, they settle 
into the non-cooperative equilibrium where none of the members has the desire or incentive 
to move away from this outcome. Both will choose to maximise individual utility which 
leads to both of them being worse off – this is a prisoner‟s dilemma outcome. In this 
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instance, the household will have a low domestic standard of living, meaning that members 
will spend as little time and money as possible on the household, but both will have plenty of 
time and money for individual pursuits. The top right and bottom left solutions are not 
equilibrium situations because the partner that spends a larger amount of money or time on 
the household will be disadvantaged. The cooperative solution for both of them is bottom 
right in table 2.1, where the partners both decide to spend a larger amount of time and money 
on the household.  
This optimal solution can be attained in various ways. Since households are long term, 
members are able to observe each other‟s moves over repeated periods. They have the 
incentive to act justly towards each other because selfish acts will be reciprocated in the 
following period. The optimal bargained outcome is also influenced by the distribution of 
power. Both informal and formal agreements between household members can establish 
terms of living between them and how much each is supposed to contribute towards 
household wellbeing (Himmelweit, 2001:156), much like the sharing rule in Chiappori 
(1992). Bargaining power is influenced by a member‟s threat and fall back positions, a 
position that ensures their bargaining power. 
 
In the case of a husband and wife, the threat point which will ensure cooperation may be 
divorce and available marriage prospects for the partner who values marriage after the 
divorce. Although the negotiations of welfare outcomes take place intra-household, the extra- 
environmental conditions affect the bargaining process and members can use these factors to 
strengthen their fall back positions. In a marriage such a condition could be the ratio of male 
to female in the marriage market (Doss, 1996:1600). A perceived threat has to be plausible in 
order to work; that is, the other member must believe that it can be carried out (McElroy, 
1990; Lindberg and Pollak, 1993, Himmelweit, 2001). So we can say that household decision 
making is largely influenced by threat points which affect the allocation of resources within 
the household (Doss, 1996). Generally, for other members of the household the threat point 
may be losing membership of the household. Threat points are influenced by how a person 
perceives themselves and their contribution to the household. 
 
 
 
2.7.3 The household as a site of cooperative conflict 
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The bargaining process may not be equitable, because households are sites of cooperative 
conflict (Sen, 1990) where people do not lack resources because of unavailability but because 
of a lack of entitlement and how they perceive their contribution in the household. Sen 
(1990) found this to be the case in famine stricken areas of India. A member of the household 
may produce goods to sell to the market but may not be consuming what is equitable to them. 
Entitlement to resources depends on three factors: 1) the individual‟s prospects if cooperation 
breaks down; 2) the extent to which different members bargain for their own material 
welfare; and 3) the way each member of the household is perceived. Sen (1990) rejects the 
Nash bargaining solution because it does not consider a person‟s self-perception in the 
bargaining process. Sen (1990) states that utility differs from material welfare and that the 
distinction between the two drives people‟s behaviour. The difference is illustrated in a 
mother‟s perception of utility: a mother may perceive her utility to incorporate that of her 
children, often forgoing her own welfare for that of her children, placing her in a 
compromised position.  
 
2.8 Determinants of bargaining power in the household  
 
Bargaining power determines the share of resources allocated to individuals within 
households. Quisumbing and Maluccio (2000) summarise the determinants of bargaining 
power into four points: 1) control over resources, 2) external and internal factors that can 
influence the bargaining process such as law and human capital; 3) the mobilisation of 
interpersonal networks; and 4) attitudinal disposition. Control over resources is control over 
assets, income and unearned income, transfer and welfare receipt.  
 
Quisumbing and Maluccio (2000) conducted a cross-sectional study of gender and intra-
household resource allocation across four countries, South Africa, Indonesia, Ethiopia and 
Bangladesh. Taking cognisance of country-specific nuances, they found that women 
generally bring in fewer assets to the marriage, with the exception of Sumatra in Bangladesh, 
where women bring in more land to the marriage. For women, this means that their initial 
bargaining position could be low owing to a lack of material contribution; however, this 
depends on the value attached to bringing in assets rather than the woman‟s potential 
contribution to marriage. Income is also an important determinant of power in the household. 
Women who controlled income in the household had better bargaining positions and the 
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distribution of welfare in the household was empathetic to children‟s needs (Thomas, 1990; 
1994; Attanasio and Lechene, 2002).  
 
Unearned income also influences bargaining positions in households. Literature on the 
household‟s allocation of resources indicates that the person receiving the income influences 
resource allocation (Thomas, 1990; Duflo, 2003; Betrand, Mullainathan and Miller, 2003; 
Edmonds et al, 2004). In South Africa it was found that, where an elderly person receives the 
OAP, the weight-for-height scores
9
 of children were higher where the person receiving the 
pension was female rather than male (Duflo, 2003). This does not necessarily mean that the 
elderly person is the household head, but simply that their pension influences the direction of 
welfare and equitability.
10
 It is also evident that prime aged individuals
11
 are also likely to 
take advantage of this situation by attaching themselves to households that have an elderly 
person in them (Edmonds et al, 2004; Wittenberg, 2001).  
 
Attanasio and Lechene (2002) measure the impact of exogenous changes in the intra-
household distribution of resources on household decisions using Progresa data from 
Mexico‟s conditional transfer programme. They reject pooling of resources within the 
household and infer that a wife‟s relative income has a significant effect on her decision 
making in the household. The higher the share of income, the higher their level of decision 
making, favourably affecting their fallback position and threat point in the household. 
The threat point or bargaining position in the model is also influenced by parameters such as 
laws, institutions and legal factors, skills, ability to acquire information and education 
(Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2000). The way in which these factors affect bargaining 
positions is by strengthening or weakening a partner‟s position within the household. An 
example of this is a law governing child benefits and custody in case of a divorce. The 
partner who is placed at a disadvantage by these laws may be willing to renegotiate and 
provide better living conditions for the other spouse. The mobilisation of interpersonal 
networks, such as membership of an organisation and access to social networks, may 
influence a person‟s bargaining position. Living in a community or in close proximity to 
family could increase a person‟s bargaining strength if they know that they have the support 
                                                 
9
 Measuring height for weight in children, where the measure of height and weight determines the child’s 
nutritional status for their particular age. 
10
 The social grants are discussed in chapter 4.   
11
 Prime aged individuals, are persons between the ages of 15-60 (women)/63 (men) who can participate in 
the labour force. 
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of family and community if the marriage should not work out. Finally, attitudinal disposition 
and personal perception, as raised by Sen (1990), plays a role in that a person‟s perception of 
themselves influences their bargaining position. A healthy self-esteem may increase what a 
person gets out of household negotiations.  
 
2.9 The impact of unearned income such as the social grants on resource 
allocation in the household  
 
Both the unitary and collective models make strong inferences about the influence of 
unearned income on decision making and, therefore, resource allocation in the household. 
There is an argument to be made for unitary models in households, where income enters the 
household with the purpose of affecting an individual‟s welfare. In such a case, the 
household rebalances itself, meaning that the targeted individual is no better or worse off 
than before the transfer (Rosenzweig, 1986). The plausibility of the unitary model is that 
individuals who are part of a household cannot act independently of such a household. 
Therefore, policy cannot target individuals that are within a household, as the household has 
rules that govern it. Critically, however, the unitary model implies that unearned income 
entering a household affects its members the same way as before unearned income and the 
decision rule in the household remains the same (Thomas, 1990:636; Alderman et al, 
1995:12; Barientos and DeJong, 2006: 542). This means that a child who gets food at school 
as part of a government feeding scheme programme may not be offered food at home, thus 
the child will not have gained any value from the feeding programme. Therefore, according 
to the unitary model, cash transfers targeting a particular individual within the household, 
such as a child, will benefit all members of the household according to the redistribution and 
welfare objectives of that household. Hence, in the unitary model there is no direct way of 
targeting individuals through cash transfers. Cash transfers are rather intended as 
supplementary income to the household, in the hopes that the transfer will increase the 
household‟s standard of living and somehow affect the child‟s welfare (Alderman, 1998). 
Policy objectives in a unitary framework cannot be targeted at an individual who is within a 
household, as they cannot act independently of the household.  
 
Welfare outcomes after a household has received cash transfers show that there is a 
difference in the allocation of resources. Cash transfers have an effect on the general welfare 
of the family, especially that of children in developing countries (Thomas, 1990; Attanasio 
38 
 
and Lechene, 2002; Duflo, 2003; Barientos and Dejong, 2006, Aguero et al, 2007). The 
introduction of unearned income into households changes many of the dynamics, such as 
power and decision making; essentially it is the identity of the recipient that seems to matter 
(Attanasio and Lechene, 2002, Duflo, 2003). Such findings are also evident in the case of 
South Africa when looking at intra-household resource allocation in households with OAP 
recipients. Collective models infer that the cash transfer changes the composition and 
allocation of income in the household. These collective bargaining models pose challenges to 
the welfare outcomes, as these outcomes depend on how a person perceives their worth as 
part of the household. The distribution may not be equitable, as households are sites of 
cooperative conflicts. The study by Duflo (2003) illustrates a bias in terms of who the social 
grant earner is and thus how the income is distributed in the household.  
 
2.10 Conclusion 
 
The household is an important intermediary between aggregate policies, local programmes 
and individual welfare (Rosenzweig, 1986). The challenge in terms of the household arises 
because interaction between members is not observed; only the outcomes can be measured in 
the form of human capital indicators. The unitary model presumes that a household is an 
income-pooling entity represented by common preferences. The collective models, on the 
other hand, regard the household as a site for negotiated outcomes, depending on the threat 
and fall back positions of individuals. Unfortunately, the unitary model does not offer an 
explanation about the process by means of which households allocate resources. Inequalities 
within the household could be further entrenched by misguided policies that target an 
individual within a household, if the dynamics of the members‟ interactions are not 
understood.  
 
Furthermore, the neoclassical model aggregates household utility which compromises 
information about individual preferences. Theoretically, the model offers a simplified 
platform for evaluating policy, although its form “does violence to reality” (Rosenzweig, 
1986), as it fails empirically to prove the claim that households do pool income and the 
recipient of income does not matter.  
 
There seem to be distinctive ways in which households deal with distribution of resources 
among its members along gender lines; with the introduction of welfare transfers in the hands 
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of women reaching children better than in the hands of men. What implications does this 
have for decision making in the household, should unearned income targeted at children be 
paid out to women? This surely will have long-run consequences on the dynamics in the 
household, not all positive. Perhaps rehabilitative programmes, as suggested in Black (2004), 
will turn the rotten parent from their selfish ways, especially if other members have no 
negotiating power. Whatever the case, households are complex and their preferences cannot 
be aggregated, thus we have to analyse another theory that may shed light on these household 
dynamics about sharing resources, inequality and general welfare in the household –the 
collective bargaining model.    
 
There are various kinds of bargaining models which depart from aggregating household 
welfare. The collective model lets data describe the decision rule in each household and the 
model contains four assumptions that ensure the sharing rule. The unitary and cooperative 
models are limited specifications of the collective model. The cooperative model is also the 
only model that has a specific Pareto efficient point. In terms of this model, individuals do 
not pool their resources but rather maximise utility taking the other person‟s contribution as 
given. The EEP affects a person‟s contribution and negotiating power in the household, 
which may result in a spouse having better living conditions in a marriage.  
 
The model highlights the interaction between the two partners in a household, although this 
could be generalised to a many-person household. What is important here is the threat points 
and fallback positions, which are not observable in the model but do affect outcomes. These 
threat points and fall back positions do not necessarily have to be enforceable but they have 
to be believable. This was explored further by looking at the four factors that influence the 
bargaining position of each member, the control of resources such as assets, and internal and 
external factors that influence decision making. Internally, these could be an individual‟s set 
of skills, and externally it could be legislation that governs the dissolution of households. 
Social networks are also important for members of the household, including community 
support. Finally, the attitudinal disposition of a person will also influence their bargaining 
position in a household, which could explain the different poverty levels experienced by 
members of the same household.  
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Understanding the dynamics of poverty by knowing what the markers of poverty are, 
discussed in chapter 3, enables us to examine whether these kinds of households are well 
targeted by the grants.  
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3. Poverty in South Africa  
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Social grants are aimed at reducing poverty. To assess their effectiveness as poverty tools, it 
is necessary to conduct an analysis of poverty as a phenomenon in South Africa. Such an 
analysis will thus give insight into the nature of poverty in South Africa. The analysis will 
attempt to answer two questions: 1) Who is considered poor? This will be done by 
considering the prevalence, depth and severity of poverty. 2) What are the distinguishing 
markers of poverty? This will be addressed by assessing the dimensions of poverty.  
 
Knowledge of the prevalence, depth and severity of poverty is important for understanding 
what the grants are required to do and the dimensions of poverty are useful for maximising 
the impact of the social grants. Besides these two functions, knowledge of trends in poverty 
is constructive for assessing the impact of grants.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to construct a poverty profile of South Africa. Such an analysis 
requires the contextualisation of poverty by highlighting the debate on the nature of poverty 
(see section 3.2). The complexities involved in quantifying poverty mean that income 
poverty is no longer considered the only convention for representing the poor. Because 
poverty is multidimensional, numerous techniques have been used to quantify it as it cannot 
be aptly captured by just one measure. The methods and techniques of such measurements 
are discussed in section 3.3. The discussion on the multidimensional nature of poverty 
validates the use of other indicators, such as access to clean water, to expand our knowledge 
on the nature of poverty in South Africa. Therefore, in section 3.5, the dissertation uses the 
income measures, together with other multidimensional measures, to construct South 
Africa‟s poverty profile. These multidimensional measures also allow for cross-country 
comparisons with similar developing countries (see section 3.4). The purpose of such a 
comparison is to assess the country‟s relative performance against that of other middle-
income countries on the same development path and even some lower-income countries. In 
order to carry out this assessment of the comparability of poverty between countries, there 
needs to be an appreciation of the nature of poverty. 
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3.2 The nature of poverty  
 
To devise policies that attain the goal of eradicating poverty, it is important to understand the 
nature of poverty. A definition of poverty is intended to capture the deprivation experienced 
by an individual (World Bank, 2000; Bhorat, Woolard and Leibrandt, 2000; Chamber, 1988; 
Sen, 1976; 1979), For a long time income was used as an indication of deprivation until 
Sen‟s (1976) critique on the use of income poverty to identify the poor. His work paved the 
way to questioning the one-dimensionality of this poverty measure and expanded the 
conceptualisation of poverty beyond income deprivation. This is not to disregard the role of 
income to quantify poverty; indeed, income measures summarise the number of the poor 
below a certain income level and therefore the amount of income needed by individuals to 
meet basic needs. It is true that income expands the number of consumption choices that a 
poor person has, but the measure fails to appreciate the complexity of the nature of poverty. 
These complexities could be best captured by social indicators such as adult literacy rates, 
access to health care and life expectancy at birth. The question is whether poverty should be 
defined according to minimal standard of living (absolute) or should it be defined according 
to an income distribution definition (relative) (O‟Boyle and Edwards, 1999). For instance, 
Sen (1979) is critical of the view that poverty is a value judgement but, on the other hand, it 
can be argued that the definition of poverty cannot remain static and must change according 
to the demands of society and time. Perhaps a single definition will not suffice given the 
multidimensionality of poverty and it would be more appropriate for a class of measures to 
be used together to reflect the whole picture of poverty. The Human Development Index
12
 
(HDI) is an example of a multidimensional indicator of poverty by country.  
 
We have come to understand that poverty is more than income and expenditure inequality; it 
also manifests in other aspects of life. Although it is hard to articulate the meaning of 
poverty, the absence of certain resources that society deems as necessities, such as primary 
and high school education and sanitation and so on, also signifies a level of poverty. We have 
also come to understand that members of the same household can have different poverty 
rates; chapter 2 discussed at length the implications of resource allocation on the distribution 
of welfare among members of the same household. However, without being fixated on the 
                                                 
12
 Besides the HDI, there has been recent work on devising a single multidimensional index. In their paper, 
Alkire and Santos (2010) develop a multidimensional poverty index (MPI) for 104 developing countries.  
Also see Alkire and Foster (2007). 
Batana (2008) applies the MPI to sub-Saharan countries.  
43 
 
subjectivity of the definition of poverty, the dissertation will identify a definition to use for 
describing poverty in South Africa. 
 
Consequently, the definition of poverty applied in this dissertation is one that defines poverty 
as a lack of command over resources illustrated by the absence of certain social indicators in 
a particular society. Indicators of poverty measure the “wellbeing” of society according to a 
socially accepted standard of living (Woolard and Leibbrandt, 1999). Social welfare is a 
function of the welfare of the poor, because poverty is seen as underdevelopment and its 
eradication increases the welfare and utility of society (Deaton, 1997:140). In all, the 
dissertation is of the view that reporting both income measures and social indicators of 
poverty is beneficial in creating a comprehensive picture of poverty, as the nature of poverty 
is not one dimensional and consequently improves the targeting of the social grants.  
 
3.3 Measuring poverty 
 
When measuring poverty, we are measuring the wellbeing of society, the welfare of the 
members of society most vulnerable to economic conditions, the standard of living and the 
state of deprivation among people (Bhorat, Poswell and Naidoo, 2004:1). According to Sen 
(1979:285), the measurement of poverty comprises two steps: 1) identification, which asks: 
who are the poor? and 2) aggregation, which constructs a profile of the poor in a given 
society.   
 
The income poverty line methods are methods that are widely used for the identification of 
the poor. From Sen‟s (1976) headcount and poverty gap critique as methods of identifying 
the poor arose literature aimed at capturing the multidimensionality of poverty (Chamber, 
1988; Ravallion, 1992). The reasoning behind multidimensional measures is that each person 
is represented by a vector of characteristics such as health, living conditions, access to clean 
water and sanitation (Streeten, 1995; Ravallion, 1992).  
 
In the measurement of poverty, various methods are used, but the particular focus of this 
dissertation is the poverty line. The relevance of poverty lines is that “[p]overty lines separate 
the poor from the non-poor of society and aid in constructing a poverty profile” (Woolard 
and Leibbrandt, 1999:8). Poverty lines are imperfect and arbitrary but, for policy purposes, 
this line must be drawn somewhere.  
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The idea of a poverty line is not that household/individual vulnerability can be 
satisfactorily reduced for analytical purposes to a single index, but rather that a 
consistent measure, while imperfect as a gauge … can serve as a useful comparative 
index of trends over time …‟ (StatsSA, 2007:2). 
 
Two types of poverty line exist: absolute poverty lines and relative poverty lines, which are 
both adjusted for prices. Absolute poverty lines are absolute measures of basic needs based 
on an identified consumption basket of goods. Using these measures, poverty is identified as 
a lack of command over resources to meet basic needs (Woolard and Leibbrandt, 1999:9). An 
example of such a poverty line is the dollar-a-day poverty line, which allows for international 
comparisons. Absolute poverty lines do not change with the standard of living, reflecting 
minimum requirement of a basic command in resources for individuals (Coudouel, Hentschel 
and Wodon, 2004:33).  
 
The relative poverty line is defined by the moving standard of living and reflects a society‟s 
perception of poverty; it could thus be measured at 50% of the income earned or some other 
measure. In such a society, the poor are considered to be those that fail to meet the particular 
line; suffering relative deprivation (Coudouel et al, 2004). The objection to the measure of 
relative poverty is that “the poor will always be among us” – even if standards of living 
drastically improve, the share of those in poverty will remain unaffected (Woolard and 
Leibbrandt, 1999:48). Measured poverty is never overcome if a relative poverty line is used, 
as there will always be the relatively poor in society. As Sen (1979:288) argues in this regard, 
adequate poverty measurement always requires an absolute poverty line: “… there is an 
irreducible core of absolute poverty which translates starvation, severe malnutrition and 
visible hardship into a diagnosis of poverty without waiting to ascertain the relative picture.”  
 
3.3.1  Constructing a poverty line  
 
There are two general approaches to drawing a poverty line, the Food Energy Intake (FEI) 
method or the Cost of Basic Needs (CBN) method. The FEI is a regression equation
13
 that 
links the value of food consumption to calories consumed (Thorbecke, 1998). It is computed 
using the Recommended Daily Allowance (RDA) of calories and reflects the behaviour of 
                                                 
13
 Regression equation: ln VFC = a + bCal, obtained through observing household consumption where VFC is 
the value of food consumption and Cal is the amount of calories consumed.  
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individual households around consumption. The RDA for South Africa is 2261 kilocalories 
per person, as recommended by the Medical Research Council (MRC). In rand terms this is 
R211 per person at 2000 prices (StatsSA, 2007). The FEI reflects food poverty alone and 
would need to be extended to include other basic material needs that individuals may have, 
such as shelter. The CBN method is a consumption bundle that is necessary for basic 
survival, drawn from nutritional requirements for good health. This is a bundle of goods 
which is used as a reference group. The disadvantage with this approach is that the reference 
group may not be representative of the whole population (Thorbecke, 1998). Both these 
methods are rooted in caloric intake, and then use other measures for non-food components, 
such as levels of education, health index and life expectancy at birth. There seems to be three 
most basically agreed-on components namely: 
 
Poverty line = benchmark poverty line × equivalence scale × updating index 
 
There is no single method for arriving at a poverty line using the above equation, simply 
because all of the three components have different proxies in practice. The benchmark 
poverty line can be calculated using the minimum wage, social grant or a percentage of 
median income. The equivalent scale, which is used for normalisation because households 
differ in size and composition, can be based on expenditure data, consumer demand theories. 
Finally, the updating index can comprise the Consumer Price Index (CPI) or the GDP 
deflator to name just two (Johnson, 1996).  
 
Preliminary research into a poverty measure for South Africa shows that the cost of a child is 
almost the same as that of an adult (StatsSa, 2007:5), which implies that there may not be a 
need for an equivalence scale.
14
 In the document, A national poverty line for South Africa, 
StatsSA (2007) examines the need for a nominal adjuster of the poverty line to reflect the 
consumption basket of poor households. While the CPI has been a more obvious choice, it 
should be noted that, in the past, there was a marked difference between changes in the CPI 
and changes in the prices of staple foods. A poverty line adjusted by the CPI would not truly 
reflect the income required for a set standard of living, as this in turn would lead to a 
misrepresentation of the number of people under the poverty line. Thus, the Foster-Greer- 
Thorbecke measures of poverty have become the standard in poverty analysis. As the 
                                                 
14
 For an in depth analysis: see Streak, Yu and van der Berg (2008).  
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analysis in the profile of poverty uses these measures, they are examined in more detail 
below.  
The Foster Greer Thorbecke (FGT) class of poverty measures 
 
The FGT class of poverty measures can be represented by the equation 
 
where α = 0 is headcount 
 α = 1 Poverty gap 
 α = 2 Squared poverty gap 
z = poverty line 
yi = is the standard of living indicator for the i
th
 household 
n = population size 
 
Literature published prior to 1984 already called for measures of poverty that would be 
decomposable in order to be able to evaluate poverty for different subgroups. Hence, the 
FGT measures have been widely used to profile poverty, as they are decomposable and 
comparisons between households of different kinds and individual subgroups are possible 
(Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, 1984). 
 
According to Sen (1976), a good poverty measure has to satisfy four axioms, namely:  
1. Monotonicity – all other things being equal, a reduction in income of a person below 
the poverty line increases the extent of poverty as measured by the poverty measure. 
2. Transfer axiom – a pure transfer of income from a person below the poverty line to 
anyone who is richer must increase the poverty measure. 
3. Population symmetry – if two or more identical populations are pooled, the poverty 
index must not change. 
4. Proportion of poor – if the proportion of the population that is poor grows or 
diminishes the poverty index must reflect this by either rising or falling. 
These axioms are used in the remainder of the section as criteria to assess the FGT measures. 
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The headcount ratio 
 
The headcount ratio has become one of the most quoted poverty measures in the family of 
FGT measures. It is simply the proportion of the population that is below a set poverty line. It 
can be written as follows: 
 
P0 = H = q/n  
Where q = number of people 
 n = population size 
 
This is a crude measure as it does not reveal any of the characteristic of poverty in that 
particular society, such as the severity with which poverty is experienced by some or the 
anatomy of poverty in that particular society.
15
 However, the poverty ratio is easily 
understandable and communicable (Thorbecke, 1998), as it simply stipulates the incidence of 
poverty in that particular community. However, the headcount ratio is in violation of the first 
two of Sens‟s axioms, monotonicity and transferability, because the ratio does not consider 
the severity of poverty below the poverty line. An individual who is R100 below the poverty 
line is recorded as having the same severity of poverty as a person who is R1000 below the 
poverty line (Johnson, 1996:114). The headcount is also insensitive to the distribution of 
income among the poor; a transfer of income from a person who is poorer to one who is less 
poor is not recognised as a change in poverty even though there has been a change in relative 
wealth (Sen, 1976:219). Because of this shortcoming, the headcount ratio should be used in 
conjunctions with the poverty gap index. 
 
The poverty gap index (PG) 
 
The PG index is a refinement of the headcount ratio and measures the average distance that a 
poor individual is from the poverty line, that is, it measures the depth of poverty below the 
poverty line (Woolard and Leibbrandt, 1999:56). The poverty gap can also be expressed as 
an aggregate measure of the poverty deficit, representing the amount that is needed to lift the 
poor up to the poverty line (May, Woolard and Klasen, 2000:30). 
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Where, 
 z = poverty line 
yi = is standard of living indicator for the i
th
 household 
α = the aversion to poverty parameter 
 
Squared poverty gap index (SPG) 
 
This measure reflects the distribution of poverty below the poverty line. Accordingly, it 
measures the severity of poverty by not only taking into account the depth of poverty 
reflected by PG, but also the inequality among the poor, which is reflected in the formula 
(Coudouel et al, 2004:35). 
 
 
The advantage of this measure is that it gives more weight to individuals who are further 
away from the poverty line. A person who is R1000 below the poverty line is deemed poorer 
than one who is R100; so a decrease in the standard of living for someone further from the 
poverty line will be deemed greater the poorer the person is (Woolard and Leibbrandt, 
1999:58) and their poverty severity is given more weight in the aggregate measure of 
poverty.  
 
3.3.2 Data and methodology 
 
The FGT measures were applied to the data contained in the 2005 South African Income and 
Expenditure Survey (IES) in order to compile a poverty analysis of the country. The method 
of capturing data differed slightly in this survey compared to the previous IES1995 and 
IES2000. In this regard, A recall and diary method was used to capture data whereas the 
previous two surveys used only the recall method. Using the recall method, the participant 
records their total expenditure over the 12-month period using the main questionnaire; this 
comprises the annualised expenditure figure. The diary method requires respondents to keep 
a diary of their expenditure for four weeks. Different groups of participants were asked to fill 
in this diary for each subsequent month, never having the same people fill in the diary for 
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longer than a month. The diary method was used mainly for non-durable goods such as food. 
These non-durable items were recorded for a month using the diary method and this 
expenditure figure was then annualised. Semi-durable and durable items were recorded using 
both the diary method for a month and the recall method for 11 of the 12 months to give an 
annualised figure for 12 months. Finally, the durable items and services were recorded using 
only the recall method for 12 months, giving the annualised figure. 
 
The proposed poverty line used in this chapter is the R322 lower bound used by StatsSA 
(2007) or R3864 per annum (see figure 3.1 below). Decomposed, this amount consists of 
R211 for basic food needs and R111 for essential non-food items per month. The upper 
bound amount is R593, which includes other non-food items that would not be considered for 
basic survival. This poverty line (R322) is used to measure both the poverty share and the 
incidence if poverty in the population and for households. Poverty share is the proportion of 
poverty that a particular group of people take in the total poverty of a particular group. 
Poverty incidence is the extent to which poverty affects a particular group; for example the 
incidence of poverty among women is 54.1% (StatsSA, 2005).  
 
Figure 3.1: Poverty lines (2000) prices 
 
Source: StatsSA (2005) 
 
Before applying poverty lines to South African data in section 3.5, section 3.4 compares the 
multidimensional indices of a selected group of developing countries with those of South 
Africa. 
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3.4 South Africa’s development in an international context 
 
South Africa is compared to Brazil, Russia, India and China (the BRIC countries),
16
 and 
Malaysia because of similar GDP per capita. The other countries are the Eastern Europe 
countries of the Czech Republic and Hungary and African countries, including Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia and Mauritius. A number of multidimensional indices indicate that, 
although South Africa‟s GDP per capita is high when compared to these countries, it is still 
faced with income distribution challenges (table 3.1). GDP per capita is a proxy for the 
average income of individuals in the country. If the income of a country were to be divided 
equally, GDP per capita is the income that each person in the country would be receiving. 
South Africa has a relatively high GDP per capita and hence it is classified as a middle-
income developing country. Its GDP per capita is higher than that of the BRIC countries, but 
the gaps are closing because of the economic growth rate of these countries.  
 
However, GDP per capita is not a good proxy for standard of living, because it does not 
account for any discrimination in the distribution of income. In this regard, there are other 
indices such as life expectancy at birth that can be used together with GDP per capita to 
construct a more accurate picture and highlight the developmental challenges still faced by 
the country. The life expectancy at birth in South Africa is 50.8 years; this is below the life 
expectancy in the BRIC countries and also below that of the Czech Republic and Hungary. In 
Africa, Mauritius‟s life expectancy (68.7 years) far exceeds that of South Africa. As a matter 
of fact, South Africans have a 31.3% chance of not surviving to the age of 40. This is one of 
the highest probabilities in this sample of countries, only exceeded by other African 
countries. In addition, the adult literacy rate of 82.2 % is the third lowest in this sample of 
countries; South Africa‟s performance is only marginally better than Botswana and Lesotho. 
Besides this, 12% of the population still does not have access to an improved water source, 
although the country performs better than China (23%) and India (14%) in this regard. In 
Africa, only Botswana (5%) has better access to an improved water source than South Africa. 
Owing to policy measures such as school feeding schemes and the child support grant, there 
                                                 
16
 South Africa has recently been included as part of BRICS (newly advanced developing countries). BRIC 
countries are becoming leaders of economic development in the “global” South of economically developing 
countries. It is useful to compare South Africa’s development to these countries and ascertain how it fares as a 
development leader in the global south.  
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are relatively few underweight children in South Africa; 12% of children below the age of 
five are underweight, whereas this figure is 47% for India.  
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Table 3.1: Key development indicators by country 
Country Human 
development 
index 
Life 
expectancy 
at birth 
Adult 
literacy 
rate 
GDP 
per 
capita 
in US 
$ 
Human 
poverty 
index 
in % 
Probability 
at birth of 
not 
surviving 
to age 40 
in % 
Population 
not using 
improved 
water 
source in 
% 
children 
underweight 
(% under 
age 5) 
GDP per 
capita 
annual 
growth rate 
%  (1990-
2005) 
HDI 
ranking 
Brazil  0.8 71.7 88.6 7,200 9.7 9.2 10 6 1.1 70 
Russia 0.802 65 99.4 10,845 0.782 - - - -0.1 67 
India 0.619 63.7 61 3,452 31.3 16.8 14 47 4.2 128 
China  0.777 72.5 90.9 6,757 11.7 6.8 23 8 8.8 81 
Malaysia 0.811 73.7 88.7 10,882 8.3 4.4 1 11 3.3 63 
South 
Africa 
0.674 50.8 82.4 11,110 23.5 31.7 12 12 0.6 121 
Botswana 0.654 48.1 81.2 12,387 31.4 44 5 13 4.8 124 
Lesotho 0.549 42.6 82.2 3,335 34.5 47.8 21 20 2.3 138 
Namibia 0.65 51.6 85 7,586 26.5 35.9 13 24 1.4 125 
Mauritius 0.804 68.7 99.6 12,715 11.4 5.1 0 15 3.8 65 
Czech  0.891 75.9 - 20,538 - - - - 1.9 32 
Hungary 0.874 72.9 - 17,887 - - - - 3.1 36 
                                                                Source: World Bank 2008
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As GDP per capita does not show the distribution of income, it is also useful to include a 
measure like the Gini index. The Gini index is a summary measure of the distribution of 
income derived from the Lorenz curve and it ranges from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect 
inequality). This index measures the extent to which income between individuals or 
households deviates from a hypothetical equal distribution line. In the past, South Africa 
reflected the inequalities of the past with one of the highest Gini indexes in the world. Table 
3.2 shows that the Gini index for South Africa is still relatively high, 57.8, with South Africa 
being tied with Brazil, although the spread of the poor in the income deciles in each country 
may differ.   
 
Table 3.2: International comparison of income distribution 
 
Poorest  20%  Richest 
20% 
Income ratio of 
the richest 10% to 
poorest 10% 
Income 
ratio of 
richest 
20% to 
poorest 
20% 
Gini 
index 
Brazil  2.8 61.1 51.3 21.8 57 
Russia 6.1 46.6 12.7 7.6 39 
India 8.1 45.3 8.6 5.6 36.8 
China  4.3 51.9 21.6 12.2 46.9 
Malaysia 4.4 54.3 22.1 12.4 49.2 
South Africa 3.5 62.2 33.1 17.9 57.8 
Botswana 3.2 65.1 43 20.4 60.5 
Lesotho 
     
Namibia 1.4 78.7 128.8 56.1 74.3 
Mauritius 
     
Chile 3.8 60 33 15.7 54.9 
Czech  10.3 35.9 5.2 3.5 25.4 
Hungary 9.5 36.5 5.5 3.8 26.9 
                                                    Source: World Bank 2008 
 
The Gini index further describes the general picture of development communicated by the 
indicators, which show that income in the country is still skewed. Section 3.5 will also show 
that this inequality is still predominantly along racial lines, with a majority of whites 
clustered in the top decile and Africans clustered in the lower deciles.   
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Overall, an analysis of the development indicators shows that South Africa‟s development is 
lagging behind countries in the middle income group. This means that the high GDP per 
capita has not benefited a large section of the population. As shown, the poor only have 
command over 3.5% of the wealth of the country while the richest 20% control 62.2% of 
income (table 3.2). To understand this inequality and spread of poverty in the country, section 
3.5 analyses important demographics in South Africa‟s poverty profile as well as the markers 
of poverty. 
 
3.5 Poverty in South Africa  
 
Poverty varies depending on the poverty measure that is used (see section 3.2). Income 
poverty has declined since 1994 owing to the expansion of social assistance, especially the 
social grants (Van der Berg, Louw and Yu, 2008: 74). This improvement is illustrated by an 
increase in access to basic services by the poor. Using different poverty rates, Van der Berg et 
al (2008) show that there has been a steady decline in poverty. Be that as it may, at 47% 
using the R388 poverty line (IES 2005), the poverty headcount is still relatively high.  
 
3.5.1 Poverty rates of the various population groups 
 
Apartheid legislation in education, the labour market and social assistance deliberately 
marginalised African people‟s economic prospects. As a result of these policies, therefore, 
poverty in South Africa developed a strong racial bias.
17
 Owing to this element, we are 
interested in an analysis of poverty along racial lines. In the 16 years since democratisation, 
South Africa‟s poverty profile in the broader context has not changed. The poverty rates 
between the various population groups illustrate that poverty still shows racial trends, as the 
poor are still predominantly African (93.3%) (see figure 3.2 and table 3.3), with Africans and 
coloureds having the highest poverty rates of 54.8 and 34.2% respectively. Table 3.3 
illustrates the exceptionally high share of poverty among Africans; their share of poverty is 
markedly higher than their share of the population in contrast to the other three groups. These 
findings cement the analysis in section 3.4 that South Africa is still highly unequal and 
income inequality is along racial lines.  
 
                                                 
17
 The historical context of the South African social assistance system is examined in greater detail in chapter 4. 
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Table 3.3: Poverty rate, population share and poverty share by population group 
Population 
group 
Percentage 
share of 
population 
Poverty rate of 
population 
group (%) 
Percentage share 
of poor 
individuals 
Black 80.1% 54.8% 93.3% 
Coloured 8.7% 34.2% 6.3% 
Indian 2.5% 7.1% 0.4% 
White 8.6% 0.4% 0.1% 
All 100% 47.1% 100% 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
Figure 3.2: Poverty share by race 
 
  
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
In order to examine the composition of income inequality in depth, an analysis by quintile is 
conducted. The advantage of using quintile analysis is that it offers a demographic 
composition at different income levels. While the Gini index tells us the extent of inequality, 
a quintile analysis shows us how this inequality is spread along demographic lines, allowing 
us to decompose income inequality. Accordingly, the first quintile represents the poorest 
individuals or households and the fifth quintile represents the richest individuals or 
households (figure 3.3). Households headed by Africans fall largely into the lowest quintiles, 
which emphasises the point that poverty still has a racial element. White-headed households 
appear from the third quintile, showing their relative affluence. Hence, whites are 
concentrated in the top quintiles and African in the bottom quintiles.  
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Figure 3.3: Race of household head in each quintile (excluding unspecified) 
 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
Thus far, only the headcount of poverty has been analysed, that is, how many people fall 
below the poverty line. In table 3.4 below, the poverty gap measure illustrates a similar 
pattern to the poverty headcount. Poverty is highest among Africans followed by coloured, 
Indian and then white South Africans. While the headcount ratio allocates equal weight to 
individuals falling below the poverty line, the squared poverty gap measure allocates more 
weight to individuals falling further from the line. Africans were furthest from the poverty 
line meaning that Africans were deeper into poverty than other races.  
 
Table 3.4: Decomposition of FGT measures by race 
 Poverty 
headcount 
α = 0 
Poverty 
gap 
α = 1 
Severity 
of 
poverty 
α = 2 
African 0.552 0.239 0.068 
Coloured 0.346 0.132 0.013 
Indian 0.078 0.022 0.000 
White 0.004 0.001 0.084 
Source: Armstrong and Burger (2009) 
 
The third index, the poverty gap squared, measures the shortfall of each individual below the 
poverty line. Individuals who fall furthest from the poverty line are weighted more heavily 
57 
 
than those who lie closer to the poverty line; this is done by squaring the poverty gap ratio 
(Armstrong and Burger, 2009:8). This measure places greater emphasis on the severity of 
poverty than the preceding measures. It is logical that people who fall below the poverty line 
are not all equally poor; there are some whose income shortfall from the poverty line is less 
than others. Hence, the poverty gap which measures severity captures this income inequality 
among the poor. As discussed in section 3.3, despite its algebraic appeal, this measure has the 
disadvantage of not being as interpretable as the previous two measures. According to this 
measure, poverty is also most severe among Africans, showing that social assistance 
beneficiaries are most likely to be African. Another important aspect when it comes to the 
profiling of poverty is the gender dynamic of poverty in households.  
 
3.5.2 Poverty by gender  
 
Chapter 2 discussed the allocation of resources along gender lines, especially in communities 
in developing countries, showing that resources are allocated to the one who brings in the 
most to the family and whose self-perception is higher according to Sen (1979). The share of 
poverty among women in South Africa is higher than among men (figure 3.4).   
 
Figure 3.4: Share of poverty by gender 
 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
The poverty bias toward females is also reflected in the share of poverty by gender of 
household head, where 54.6% of households in the first quintile are headed by females with 
only 45.3% being headed by males (table 3.5). Additionally, the standard of living in male-
headed households is on average higher than in female-headed households. Female headship 
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is most prominent in the lower quintiles and, as the standard of living improves, male 
headship becomes more prominent. This shows that male-headed households are generally 
better off than female-headed households.  
 
Table 3.5: Household headship by gender in quintiles  
 Quintile1 Quintile2 Quintile3 Quintile4 Quintile5 Total 
Male 45.3% 51.2% 60.9% 71.1% 76.8% 61.1% 
Female 54.6% 48.7% 39.1% 28.8% 23.1% 38.9% 
Unspecified 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
3.5.3 Poverty by Province 
 
As illustrated in figure 3.5 below, individual poverty is highest in Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal 
and the Eastern Cape. These are the most populous and rural provinces (at the time of 
IES2005/6). Sixty per cent of South Africa‟s poor live in these three provinces, while the two 
richest provinces (Gauteng and the Western Cape) have only a sixth of the poor (Armstrong, 
Lekezwa & Siebrits, 2008:10).  
 
Figure 3.5: Poverty rate by province 
 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
 
59 
 
Households in KwaZulu-Natal have the highest share of poverty, followed by the Eastern 
Cape and Limpopo (figure 3.6). Although Gauteng has the lowest incidence of poverty, 
according to figure 3.6, it has the fourth highest share of poor households. These provinces 
are also the most populous, with 47% of South Africa‟s population at the time of IES2005. 
 
Figure 3.6: Poverty share by province 
 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
Table 3.6: Income distribution by province  
 Quintile1 Quintile5 
Western Cape 5.0% 17.3% 
Eastern Cape 20.4% 8.9% 
Northern Cape 2.0% 1.5% 
Free State 5.5% 7.8% 
KwaZulu-Natal 24.1% 12.8% 
North West 9.2% 6.9% 
Gauteng 8.5% 35.2% 
Mpumalanga 7.6% 4.8% 
Limpopo 17.8% 4.8% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
Households in the poorest quintile live mainly in Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern 
Cape (table 3.6). Gauteng has the highest share in the fifth quintile, 35%, followed by the 
Western Cape (17%). The fact that poverty is concentrated in the predominantly rural 
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provinces shows that the majority of the poor population live in the rural areas, with high 
percentages both in the first and the second quintile (table 3.7).  
 
Table 3.7: Rural and urban dwellers in each income quintile  
 Quintile1 Quintile2 Quintile3 Quintile4 Quintile5 Total 
Urban 37.0% 53.2% 65.6% 79.6% 90.2% 65.1% 
Rural 63.0% 46.8% 34.5% 20.4% 9.8% 34.9% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
Although rural dwellers comprise only 34.9% of the total, the poor in rural areas are clustered 
in the ultra poor quintile. However, at the 40% quintile, there are more poor urban dwellers 
(53.2%) than there are rural dwellers (46.8 %), in fact only the poorest quintile contains more 
rural than urban dwellers. 
 
3.5.4 Poverty by age  
The poverty rate is highest in children below the age of 15 years (39%) and in the elderly 
aged 65 years and older. Poverty rates are lower for the working age
18
 group, figure 3.7 
below.  
 
Figure 3.7: Poverty rates by age 
 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
                                                 
18
 Working age population lies between 15-60 years for females and 15-65 years for males in South Africa. 
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Figure 3.8: Poverty share by age category 
 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
While figure 3.8 shows that the incidence of poverty is highest among younger people, table 
3.8 shows the incidence of poverty among heads of households. The table shows that the poor 
are concentrated in households headed by working age individuals. There are two possible 
reasons for this: Firstly, many working-age individuals may be unemployed and secondly, 
many workers earn irregular or low wages which are inadequate to lift them from poverty. 
 
Table 3.7: Percentage of poverty by age of household head  
 Quintile1 Quintile2 Quintile3 Quintile4 Quintile5 Total 
0–14 yrs 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 
15–24 yrs 4.2% 5.7% 6.3% 7.2% 5.0% 5.7% 
25–34 yrs 15.3% 18.6% 24.7% 28.3% 24.6% 22.3% 
35–44 yrs 20.9% 20.3% 21.3% 24.3% 23.9% 22.1% 
45–54 yrs 21.6% 19.9% 18.7% 18.4% 23.2% 20.4% 
55–64 yrs 17.0% 15.3% 14.9% 12.6% 14.7% 14.9% 
65+ yrs 20.8% 20.1% 13.8% 9.1% 8.4% 14.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
Households headed by elderly people who are 65+ yrs have the highest incidence of poverty 
(47.3%). This is as a result of the old age grant that the elderly people get, as the poor tend to 
cluster around a stable form of income however low it may be.
19
  
 
                                                 
19
 This is further explored in chapter 5 
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3.6 Non-income metric indicators of poverty 
 
The poor often lack access to basic services, such as water, sanitation, health and energy, and 
they are also socially excluded (Coudouel et al, 2004:421; Bhorat et al, 2004:5). The lack of 
provision of services to the poor increases the burden of poverty, as the time taken by the 
poor to access basic services takes away from time that they could spend in production to 
generate income; such burdens of poverty would include fetching water and firewood (RDP, 
1995:17). This section highlights the disparities that still exist between the ultra poor and the 
wealthiest quintiles. Public services not afforded to the poor further entrenches their poverty 
by demanding more of their time.  
 
The availability of energy reduces the time that the poor have to spend away from production 
activities that generate income. However, only 28.4% of the poor have access to electricity, 
which confirms that the poor are still using paraffin and firewood as forms of energy (figure 
3.9). Access to electricity as a main source of energy for cooking increases with each 
successive quintile as expected. Consequently, there were more poor households that use 
wood, 37% as opposed those that use electricity 28.4% (table 3.9). In the second quintile, 
however, almost half the households used electricity which is significantly greater than the 
bottom quintile.  
 
Figure 3.9: Percentage of households using electricity as main energy source for cooking 
 
Source: Own calculations using IES 2005 
 
3.6.1 Access to water and sanitation 
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Piped water is important for relieving the plight of poverty, as it reduces the risk of outbreaks 
of waterborne diseases such as cholera (Bhorat et al, 2004:7). Besides the risk of disease, 
poor women waste time that could be dedicated to labour market activities fetching water for 
the household. As with access to electricity, access to running water is still relatively low for 
the poor. The percentage of the ultra poor that have access to on-site or in-the-yard piped 
water is 28.6%. Very few of them have an „in-dwelling‟ water supply (12.9%).  
 
Table 3.8: Selected characteristics of South African households by quintile 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
Another basic service to which the poor have limited access is flush or chemical toilets. Only 
25.6% of households in the poorest quintile have access to these forms of toilets, compared to 
almost full coverage in the fifth quintile. These kinds of conditions increase vulnerability to 
health ailments. 
 
In all quintiles, formal housing represents more than 50% of the type of dwelling including in 
the poorest 20% (figure 3.10). The informal housing sector, however, displays a peculiar 
trend: there are more people living in informal settlements in the third quintile (18.7%) than 
in the first quintile (15.7%). These are the working poor, who are often not reached by social 
policy intervention such as social grants (Frye, 2007).  
 Quintile1 Quintile2 Quintile3 Quintile4 Quintile5 
Electricity from mains 28.3% 49.2% 61.1% 76.4% 92.1% 
Electricity from generator 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
Paraffin as source of energy 28.4% 26.2% 23.9% 14.9% 3.0% 
Wood as source of energy 37.5% 18.2% 8.9% 3.2% 0.3% 
Piped water in dwelling 12.9% 25.1% 33.9% 51.0% 83.6% 
Piped water on site or in yard 28.6% 31.7% 35.8% 29.2% 11.0% 
Flush/chemical toilet 25.6% 41.7% 56.9% 74.9% 94.5% 
Pit latrine with ventilation 14.5% 10.9% 8.1% 5.1% 1.3% 
Pit latrine without ventilation 37.2% 32.5% 25.2% 14.9% 3.1% 
Refuse removed by local authority at least 
once a week 
28.4% 44.6% 56.8% 70.8% 87.3% 
Own refuse dump 58.7% 42.7% 31.7% 17.9% 6.5% 
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Figure 3.10: Main dwelling type of households by income distribution  
 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
3.7 Sources of income of the poor 
 
A lack of skills limits the employment prospects of poor people in the labour market and the 
lowest quintiles are becoming increasingly reliant on grants as a main source of income as 
illustrated in figure 3.11 below. The NIDS survey shows that poor households‟ reliance on 
grants went from 15% in 1993 to 73% in 2008 (Leibbrandt et al, 2010:26). This increased 
reliance on social grants by poor households is also shown by the decreasing trend in labour 
market income. Income decreased for all quintiles except in the highest quintile (figure 3.11). 
To compare income distribution, in 1993, the richest 10% accounted for half the income of 
the country and this figure increased to almost 60% in 2008 (Leibbrandt, 2010:26). Only 28% 
of household heads in the lowest quintile received salaries or wages; most depended on 
unspecified forms of income. This reveals the instability of regular income to these 
households. Salaries and wages, which are the most stable form of income, increase with 
each quintile, while social grants are highly concentrated in the lowest two quintiles, which 
suggests that the poor depend on the grants as a form of income and also that the grants are 
well targeted.  
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Figure 3.11: Main income source of household head in each quintile 
 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
Besides limited access to the labour market, one other reason why the lower quintiles have 
poor access to salaried income is inadequate education. Poverty is synonymous with lower 
levels of education. Over 30% of household heads in the poorest quintile have no schooling, 
in fact 99% of them have no formal school qualification, and this pattern is repeated in the 
second quintile (figure 3.12). The education levels improve in each subsequent quintile, 
which means that there is a close relationship between educational attainment and the 
prevention of poverty.  
 
Figure 3.12: Educational attainment of household head by quintile 
 
Source: own calculations using IES 2005 
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There are more household heads with incomplete secondary schooling in the population than 
no schooling at all (table3.10). It is thus in households where the head has no schooling that 
the highest poverty headcount occurs, 76.3%. In addition, the poverty gap measures of those 
who had incomplete schooling and incomplete secondary schooling were higher than those of 
other groups and poverty levels were negligible in groups where the head had a post-matric 
qualification. This shows that educational attainment does indeed play a role in preventing 
poverty, as households with high levels of educational attainment rarely become poor.   
 
Table 3.9: Decomposing poverty by educational attainment of household head 
 Population 
share 
Subgroup FGT  
  α = 0 α = 1 α = 2 
No schooling 19% 0.763 0.37 0.157 
Incomplete schooling 22% 0.647 0.284 0.084 
Incomplete secondary 37% 0.43 0.165 0.025 
Matric 13% 0.162 0.053 0.005 
Matric and diploma 5% 0.032 0.011 0 
Degree 3.30% 0.003 0 0 
   Source: Armstrong and Burger (2009) 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
The above analysis outlined the poverty level in South Africa by analysing it at both the 
household and the individual level. It is useful to explore poverty at the household level 
because household dynamics influence the allocation of resources to individual members. 
What these statistics illustrate is that poverty is multidimensional as was mentioned in the 
introduction. The poverty measures and the poverty line simply allow us to quantify at a 
certain level what a society would deem to be an acceptable standard of living. This purpose 
was served by the FGT measures at the R322 poverty line.  
 
It was also shown that poverty still has a persistent racial bias as depicted by the IES 2005/6. 
There is still great inequality between the wealthiest group and the poorest population groups. 
In this regard, quintile analyses were used to highlight the disparities that still exist among the 
income groups and the severity with which others experience poverty. The analysis of 
poverty in South Africa shows which individuals and households are affected the most by 
poverty. In this regard, it was shown that it is mainly women-headed households that are in 
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poverty; furthermore, females as a group experience higher levels of poverty than men. 
Furthermore, the highest incidences of poverty occur among children under the age of 15 and 
among the elderly aged above 65 years.  
 
The analysis also showed that it is individuals and households in the predominantly poor 
provinces that experience poverty the most; the provinces most affected by poverty being 
KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo and the Eastern Cape. This point is reiterated by the fact that 
households in the poorest quintile came mostly from rural areas, although there is significant 
poverty in the urban areas as well, as seen from the second quintile. This section of the 
poverty stricken comprises the poor living in urban areas, many of whom are migrants from 
rural areas. The poor both in urban and rural areas have limited access to basic services such 
as running water and electricity thus they spend valuable time gathering water or energy for 
cooking, instead of using this time in productive activities that would earn them an income. It 
was found that the bottom quintile still relies on wood and paraffin for cooking.  
 
The sources of income for these households were unspecified or uncertain, compared to the 
stability of wages and salary in the top two quintiles. There was also a reliance on grants as a 
source of income in the bottom quintiles, which shows the role that the social grants could be 
playing in alleviating poverty in poor households. The role of social grants should be 
understood in a historical context as grants were intended to be a small component of 
comprehensive state social assistance during the apartheid years.  
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4. The South African social security system 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Hansi Pollak (1960:22) describes South Africa‟s development trajectory during apartheid as 
one marked by “colossal achievement and tragic failure”, highlighting the peculiarity of the 
South African way of life during that era. The policy of apartheid was pervasive throughout 
society; it ruled private lives and determined policy direction that affected the country as a 
whole. Issues that government and the public were grappling with were mirrored in the 
microcosm of social welfare, which was marked by an overtone of conflict between the 
provision of welfare to the poor regardless of race and the development of separate political 
states. Pollak (1960:22) states that “there emerged a picture of extraordinary contradiction, 
bewildering in its stubborn complexities”. Towards the end of apartheid, the government had 
reached parity in the old age pension and had made great progress in reducing the gap in 
other social spending, such as education, between whites and other races. 
 
However, the old age pension‟s levels and the rate at which it was extended to Africans and 
other groups was discriminatory. It was marred by political agendas and used as an 
instrument to further advance the policy of separate development. Even so, social assistance 
attained parity in 1993 closing the discriminatory gap that existed between the races by 
increasing the welfare of the other groups while it left those of white South Africans 
unadjusted. The social security system is outlined here in order to contextualise the role of 
social grants, section 4.2. A brief history is given that sketches the inception of the old age 
pension, which further developed and established a foundation for other forms of social grant. 
Section 4.3 discusses the achievements of the apartheid welfare system, while section 4.4 
deals with the failures that resulted. The post-apartheid labour market failures and the current 
system are also discussed and then a conclusion is given. 
 
4.2 Social security system 
 
The South African social security system consists of two main components: a contributory 
social insurance and social assistance. The social insurance system consists of three 
compulsory contributory social security funds that provide conditional income for people. 
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These contributory security funds are the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF), which 
provides temporary funds to unemployed individuals who fall within categories set out in the 
Unemployment Insurance Act and the Unemployment Insurance Contribution. The 
Compensation Fund provides income benefits to workers who have been injured on the job, 
as well as providing for the rehabilitation of disabled workers and/or benefits to surviving 
families of victims of work-related deaths. The Road Accident Fund compensates for the loss 
of earnings and gives financial support to victims of road accidents (National Treasury, 
2010). Alongside the social insurance system is the social assistance system. 
 
The South African social security system provides state support over an individual‟s life 
course (Van der Berg et al, 2009:6). The life course support social security framework takes 
care of an individual throughout the life stages (table 4.1). In childhood, the government has 
made the child support grant (CSG) available, which was introduced in 1998 to assist poor 
families with children at an initial amount of R100. The care dependency grant is intended 
for disabled children below the age of 18, while the last of the childhood grants, the foster 
care grant, provides financial assistance for families who care for the children of others who 
have been deemed in need of care by the courts. Social security coverage of working age 
adults is taken care of by the state disability grant. Disability grants are made available to 
people who have been disabled by events or circumstances besides road accidents. The 
inadequacy of the social security system in providing for unemployed adults is discussed in 
section 4.4; however, prior to that, the historical context of the South African social 
assistance system is discussed below.  
 
Table 4.1: A life course social security framework 
Age 0–18 Age 16–24 Age 24–60 Age 61+ 
Child support allowance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disability allowances 
Educational allowances  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disability allowances 
Income loss insurance 
Means tested social 
assistance  
 
 
 
 
Disability allowance  
Universal pensions 
Compulsory 
contributory pensions 
Contributory survivor 
pension 
Means-tested social 
assistance 
Disability allowance 
   Source: Van der Berg et al, 2009: 8 
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4.3 A brief historical overview of the South African social assistance system 
 
In the 1920s poverty relief was carried out mainly by the churches; however, when it became 
apparent that there was a serious problem relating to poverty levels in the white community, 
the Pienaar Commission was appointed to carry out an investigation. The mandate of the 
commission was to examine and report on  
 the payment of pensions by the state to needy aged and permanently incapacitated 
persons who are unable to maintain themselves and for whom no provision at present 
exists 
 a system of national insurance as a means of making provision for the risk of sickness, 
accidents, premature death, invalidity, old age, unemployment and maternity. 
 
Poor whites had become destitute because of a multitude of problems, both exogenous and 
endogenous, such as the level of education, the labour and government policies of the day, 
the demography, environment, language and culture (see Fourie [2006] for an in-depth 
analysis of these issues and a comparison with the nature of poverty in post-apartheid South 
Africa). Iliffe (1987:117) argues that poor whites were poor because they were propertyless 
(some were bywoners, i.e. hired men on farms, poor settlers), as well as the growing number 
of unskilled and poorly trained labourers and workers outside of farming. Their poverty was 
not due to being incapacitated or unemployed but rather because of the low wages (Iliffe, 
1987).  
 
The low wages among Afrikaners were caused by the abundantly available cheap and 
unskilled African labour, especially on the Witwatersrand. The 1920s in South Africa were 
characterised by increased economic growth, owing to activity in the gold mines of the 
Witwatersrand, where skilled British and unskilled African labour in the reef competed with 
poor Afrikaners. In addition, the agricultural terrain of the countryside was changing to 
commercial agriculture, pushing out unskilled Afrikaners (Seekings, 2007:5). These problems 
consequently culminated in political pressure to resolve the poor white problem. Job 
reservation and policies to uplift poor white people included training initiatives and 
temporary and public works programmes for unskilled white labourers. Government 
parastatals such as ISCOR
20
 were expected to carry out job reservation that favoured whites, 
                                                 
20
 Iron and Steel Cooperation- ISCOR 
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even though it was costly, and government rewarded firms that employed “civilised labour” 
(Seekings, 2007). All this was done to re-establish racial hierarchy as the lines were 
becoming blurred with rural whites experiencing extreme poverty while there was upward 
mobility among some urban Africans.  
 
Despite these efforts, it soon became evident that unemployment was not the only form of 
poverty experienced by poor whites. The Pienaar Commission looked further into the issue 
and found that there was only 4% unemployment in the white and coloured communities, yet 
10% of whites were experiencing poverty (Seekings, 2007; Iliffe, 1987). It became apparent 
that there was another kind of poverty that needed urgent addressing, that needed a 
systematic set of grants whose target was instant rather than the gradual relief that had been 
adapted up to that point through public works programmes and changes in labour policies 
(Seekings, 2007). These grants were to be targeted at the “deserving poor”,21 the elderly 
people who could not be supported by their children and had fallen into poverty.  
 
Although the law stipulated that children were responsible for the maintenance of their 
parents, the Pienaar Commission found that due to changes in social structures, many 
children were unable to do this. The Commission therefore recommended that the old age 
pension bill be passed,
22
 whereby the age of eligibility was set at 65 for men and 60 for 
women, both receiving an equal amount per race. However, the Commission did not make 
any provision for Africans or Indians. The Old Age Pensions Act of 1928 served two 
purposes: to restore racial hierarchy through the discriminatory amount allocated according to 
race and to win voters, as the majority of poor whites were Afrikaner voters and were a 
strong constituency of the Pact government. The former purpose was so that poor whites 
could gain back their racial “dignity”; the Carnegie Commission of 1932 reported that in rural 
areas bywoners were regarded of lesser status than farmers, while some poor whites lived in 
multiracial slums in urban areas (Iliffe, 1987:118). The social grant, in contrast to the 
civilised labour stance of the Pact government, was an easier way of ensuring that the 
standard of living of whites and coloureds was above that of Africans. As for the voting 
power of poor whites, the Carnegie Commission criticised politicians as misguided and 
                                                 
21
 Children and the disabled were also included in the definition of ‘deserving poor’ 
22
 The work by Pienaar is preceded by Collie who investigated possible welfare systems to solve the poverty 
problem among whites. The Pienaar Commission’s work looked further into the issues of poverty in white 
communities and came to the conclusion of the much need for the old age pension already mentioned by 
Collie- see Seekings (2007) 
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irresponsible in courting poor whites for their votes by promising cash transfers. According to 
the Commission, social welfare pauperised poor whites and it rather advocated for 
rehabilitative programmes (Iliffe, 1987:121). The Carnegie Commission maintained that state 
paternalism rather the poor white‟s sense of self. 
 
The commission is convinced that much of the assistance is given in such a way as to 
have a demoralising effect on poor whites and so increases the difficulty of their 
rehabilitation. It causes loss of independence and may imbue them with a sense of 
inferiority, impairs their industry, weakens their sense of personal responsibility and 
helps to make them dishonest (Seekings, 2007:521). 
 
Social assistance went through four phases of development from 1930 until 1980 
(Bromberger 1982). The period 1930–1948 was a period of limited progress towards 
incorporation and equality, limited in the sense that the Pact government of the day 
reluctantly incorporated Africans into the system. From 1948–61 was an era of retrenchment 
where the Nationalist government scaled back on the provision of social welfare by the state. 
There were signs of a thaw in 1961–71, however, and the last phase 1972–80 showed a trend 
towards reincorporation and reduced inequality. These periods are important to illustrate the 
phase that the social assistance system went through. They are discussed in more detail 
below. The sections that follow examine the achievements and failures of the apartheid 
welfare system. 
 
4.4 The colossal achievement of the social assistance system under apartheid 
 
South African social assistance has drawn attention for its advanced development for a 
middle-income country. For a developing country, the social assistance system is considered 
exceptional, as it has been able to provide social assistance to more than a quarter of the 
South African population, and is financed by general taxes. The exceptionalism (Seekings, 
2002:12) of the system is manifest by the size of the social assistance system relative to those 
of other developing countries. The expenditure of GDP on social assistance expenditure 
amounted to 3.3% in 2009 (National Treasury, 2009:90). Its peculiarity also lies in the fact 
that at the height of apartheid in South Africa, it could be extended to all races reducing some 
of the inequality and countering poverty among other population groups that were not white. 
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In developing social security systems, middle-income countries typically start by creating 
contributory social insurance programmes, the financing burdens of which are shared by 
workers and their employers. The national pension systems of Latin American countries are 
well-known examples. The main achievement of South Africa has been to go further by 
instituting huge non-contributory grant systems funded from general tax revenue. This is 
exceptional in two senses: firstly, the social grants assist large parts of the population and, 
secondly, provide large pension and disability benefits relative to per capita income.  
 
The South African social grant reaches 27% of the population; this broad coverage starts 
from childhood, with a child support grant, and includes a disability grant for individuals who 
are unable to enter the labour market and those who are in old age
23
. The grant system is able 
to protect those who are vulnerable to poverty and are not able to meaningfully participate in 
the labour market, such as children, the aged and those with disabilities. This section 
highlights the metamorphosis of the grant system from its original purpose of taking care of a 
small number of destitute white people to becoming a source of income for almost 73% of 
households in the lowest quintile, basically becoming poverty grants. Much of this section 
highlights the instrumental role the grant system has played in keeping South Africans out of 
poverty. 
 
The Old Age Pension Act of 1928 began building a welfare system for all groups, although 
the levels of payment were initially discriminatory and Africans were initially excluded 
(Bromberger, 1982:166). The exceptionalism of the South African welfare system under 
apartheid was that its redistribution to the poor occurred through social assistance in the 
segregationist climate of apartheid (Seekings, 2002:12). Although the Pact government was 
ambivalent and perhaps more resistant to extending the social pension to Africans, this came 
to pass in 1944. Bromberger (1982) classifies this period one of “limited progress towards 
incorporation and equality”, which was reflected in the gradual shift to extend more grants, 
such as the disability grant and the child maintenance grant, to Africans. After the National 
party came into power in 1948 it threatened to abolish the African pension but never carried 
out this threat, rather letting the real value of the pension decrease. By the 1960s, there was 
evidence of a shift over time in government‟s stance over certain redistribution issues 
especially social spending concerning Africans. In an era that Bromberger (1982) classifies as 
                                                 
23
 The life course coverage of individuals by the government was discussed in section 4.2. 
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“showing signs of a thaw” there was less resistance to expanding social service provision to 
Africans and Bromberger (1982) believes that the changing economic climate might have 
influenced the policy modifications. The 1960s in South Africa were marked by relatively 
high growth which averaged about 6% per annum for the decade as whole. Thus, the climate 
was more favourable for some reform in black expenditure policy and the gap between 
African and white pension began to decrease in the mid-1960s (Kruger, 1992).  
 
The redistributive nature of social assistance is highlighted in the fiscal incidence since 1929 
till end of the apartheid era (figure 4.1), as Africans paid a small portion of the overall 
taxation. The figures below relate to all social spending
24
. 
  
Figure 4.1: Fiscal incidence for the black population, various years
 
Source: Leistner (1968:175) 
 
Figure 4.1 shows that the expenditure on Africans was more than the total taxes they paid 
throughout the years,
25
 with the gap between total taxes paid by Africans and social spending 
being almost four times by 1964/5. There had been views in the South African policy debate 
that every group should be perceived as a separate political and economic entity, thus only 
the taxes collected from the particular group should be used to finance its public spending 
                                                 
24
  Total social spending is used to show overall spending on African as there was no available data on the 
different components and proportions of social spending that went to the different races. This broad 
estimation of social spending is the closest estimation available to assist in quantifying the effects of changes 
in spending towards Africans throughout the years.  
25
 Of course the earning potential of Africans restricted the amount they could contribute to taxes as well.  
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(van der Berg, 1989:197): a counter-view was that South Africa was one nation and it did not 
matter how the tax was earned but it should be redistributed equally among its citizens. The 
prevailing middle ground between the two was that of shared fiscal responsibility between 
South Africans. Using McGrath‟s 1975 figures, Van der Berg (1989) shows the tax burden, 
government expenditure and population share by each racial group in figure 4.2. Whites paid 
77% of the tax burden, coloureds and Indians 7%, while Africans paid 16%. Government 
spending reflected that 56% of its spending went to whites, 16% went to coloureds and 
Indians, while 28% of the spending went to Africans. This contrasts with the fact that whites 
comprised 17% of the population in 1975, with coloureds and Indians comprising 12%, and 
Africans a majority of 77%. Although the majority of government spending went to whites, it 
was still far less than the share they contributed to taxes. This was redistributed through 
spending on other races. Although few whites received government benefits, those that did 
received far larger amounts than other groups.  
 
Figure 4.2: Estimated percentage shares of different groups in taxes paid, benefits 
received from government social expenditure and population, 1975 
 
 Source: Van der Berg (1989) 
 
Van der Berg (1989:197) shows that from the 1970s, the average African pension increased 
from 12% of the white pension to approximately 35% in 1985, with the values of the social 
pensions being equalised in 1993. This was partly due to the fact that government let the real 
value of white pension decrease while increasing the real value of African pension (Van der 
Berg, 1989:198). The total social expenditure per capita increased from 12% in 1975 to 21% 
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in 1986 and 28% by 1990 of per capita social spending on whites. In the last three years of 
apartheid there was a sharp increase to 69% in 1993 (van der Berg, 2001:257). Social 
spending on blacks grew at 10% per annum from 1975 to 1993 in nominal terms.  
 
4.5 Tragic failure of the apartheid social welfare system 
 
Although by the end of the apartheid era there was a degree of welfare for every race in South 
Africa, it was plagued by many challenges mainly political in nature. Despite there being 
some form of small non-contributory pensions which were given to war veterans and as child 
support, none caused as much discourse as the old age pension. The old age pension became 
the target of all that was wrong with the social welfare system, perhaps because none of the 
other preceding pensions had dealt with the question of poverty so confrontationally. The 
tragic failure of the apartheid system can be summarised into three overarching themes. The 
ambivalence that existed in extending social assistance to Africans; it took 16 years from the 
passing of the Old Age Pension Act of 1928 to extend it to Africans. Even after the old age 
pension was extended, there was much discrimination in the levels that other races received, 
which were less than that of white people. At one point the National Party threatened to stop 
Africans from receiving it. The privileged welfare state that was created to protect white 
people could not be extended in its entirety to other races. In addition, the effectiveness of 
social assistance was frustrated further by the segregation policy that was pervasive in the 
country, penetrating everyday life including the administrating of social welfare. Below is an 
analysis of these issues. 
 
The reasons for excluding Africans and there different treatment were complex (Kruger, 
1992). At the introduction of the non-contributory old age pension, the reason for resisting 
Africans receiving social welfare was the fiscal burden that an extension to their elderly 
might cause on the system. Even at discriminatory levels under Collie‟s recommendations, 
Africans would take up 40% of expenditure compared to 36% for whites, 22% for coloureds 
and 3% for Indians (Seekings:2007:15). The aspect of occupational insurance that liberated 
white South Africans from dependence on the social pensions was occupational pensions, 
whereas Africans constituted most of the poor who did not have access to such insurance. 
Thus, few whites were dependent on social assistance because of these other contingencies. 
Working age Africans had nothing to fall back on unless they qualified for disability grants. 
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As a security system for the limited number of whites who depended on it, the system 
worked.  
 
However, at the core of the resistance to extending welfare to Africans were the fears that it 
would defeat the purposes of segregation (Seekings, 2007:16). There were concerns that 
Africans would resist going back to the rural areas and there would be an influx into urban 
areas as the pension would be able to sustain Africans who remained in the urban areas. The 
other justification for not extending the grant to Africans was that under native law, it was the 
duty of the kraal head to support any member belonging to his kraal. The child maintenance 
grant for African children was also denied on these grounds and also because it was feared 
that African women would flock to the urban areas. There was a misconception that the 
standard of living in the reserves was high and, due to the agrarian nature of the rural areas, 
the reserves were self-sufficient (Kruger, 1992:165). Because of this attitude, the Native 
Economic Commission, which investigated poverty in the reserves, recommended that 
instead of giving social assistance to Africans, the appropriate response would be agricultural 
betterment in the 1930s (Seekings, 2007:17). The underlying belief about life in the reserves 
or of Africans generally was that because they were not “civilised labour”, their needs were 
basic and they carried out subsistence farming in the reserves. The reality in the reserves 
differed from this perception; they were overcrowded and were unable to sustain their 
inhabitants. Fundamentally, the exclusion of Africans was a question of whether the African 
“deserving poor” were as deserving of poverty relief as the white “deserving poor” (Seekings, 
2007). 
 
As a result of this conflict in provision, government expenditure on Africans in the 1920s was 
largely funded from their own taxes. These were mainly used to expand housing, and 
recreational and welfare services for Africans. Pollak (1960:4) highlights the paradox in this, 
that “the economically most under privileged largely paid for their services”. This was also 
the case in the period 1948 to 1961, classified as a “retrenchment era” by Bromberger (1982). 
During this era the post-1948 National Party government reversed some of the progress made 
in reducing discrimination. Expenditure on Africans was constrained as a result of the self-
balancing/financing principle (Kruger, 1992:174); which encapsulated the apartheid 
paradigm that every group should be regarded as a separate entity and thus be responsible for 
its own expenditure (Van der Berg, 1989:197). Bromberger (1982:175) remarks that the core 
policy direction during this item was regressive, as government sought to stop or slow down 
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the process of African urbanisation. Also during this period, the relatively new welfare 
system at the time came under ferocious attack from the National Party. As a result of the 
already existing government ambivalence towards financing African welfare, this period saw 
even greater retractions in the progress already made. Notably, the pension ratios were 
allowed to decrease. In 1948, the African pension had been 25% of the white pension, while 
coloured and Indian pensions were set at 50%. By 1950, the ratio had decreased to coloureds 
46.4%, Indians 39.3% and Africans 17.9% (Pollak, 1981:158). Pensions continued to 
deteriorate until 1966 for blacks although for the other races they picked up. 
 
Discrimination in the apartheid welfare system was largely due to the fact that government 
created a standard of living for white people through welfare, health and education which far 
exceeded the country‟s ability to extend the same level of welfare benefits to other races due 
to the limit in resources (Van der Berg, 1989:197). Because the number of whites on welfare 
was so negligible compared to the whole population, their pension amount could be set at a 
higher level than everyone else‟s. However, if the same amount were to be extended to 
Africans, it would cause a high fiscal burden on resources. When the pension was extended to 
Africans, they received far less than whites. In 1944, whites received R5, coloured and 
Indians R3 and Africans received R2 in nominal terms (Kruger, 1992:171). By 1947, the 
monthly income for whites was R12, R6.50 for coloureds and Indians while Africans 
received R4. It was the same with the children‟s grant: whites received R5, coloureds and 
Indians R1.70 and Africans R1.25. The alternative policy option for all these grants would 
have been to set a lower equal amount for all groups. The reason such an approach was not 
adopted, extending the full social assistance amount to other races, was because social 
assistance was used as a political instrument to establishing racial hierarchy (Seekings, 
2007a:4). 
 
The fragmentation of the welfare system caused much inefficiency. Owing to the policy of 
separate development, the National Party government wanted to establish a policy of 
segregation in all spheres of society. Although one department could administer social 
welfare effectively, it was fragmented according to race and geography. At one point, health 
services in the early 1990s were administered by 18 separate departments of health (Kruger, 
1992:195). The same happened with pensions; although they were funded by the South 
African government each homeland was responsible for its own administration. State welfare 
services for Africans were transferred to the Department of Bantu Commissioners in rural 
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areas (Pollak, 1981:170). For coloured people they were transferred to the Directorate of 
Community Welfare and Pensions of the Administration of Coloured Affairs even though in 
smaller towns they were administered by local magistrates and the Department of Social 
Welfare provided them with professional services. Indians welfare and pensions were 
directed to the Department of Indian Affairs (Pollak, 1981:170). This created inconsistencies 
in the provision of services. No one had any idea of the overall picture of welfare concerning 
Africans, Indians and coloureds or whether it was effective in targeting them. 
 
In 1976, the Theron Commission was appointed to investigate matters relating to the coloured 
population. This Commission recommended that the welfare services of government should 
be administered by one department, a department which would be responsible for the 
planning and administration of welfare for all racial groups. These recommendations were 
rejected (Pollak, 1981:170). Although the National Party made great strides in closing the 
gaps in social welfare, it had no intention of integrating South Africa. Part of the reason for 
achieving equality in the pensions was to legitimise the tricameral parliament which was a 
one step further in the segregation process (Van der Berg, 1997:487)  
 
Perhaps one of the most tragic failures of the apartheid system, which has echoed into the 
new South Africa, was its lack of recognition of the poor who did not fall into the category of 
the “deserving poor”. In South Africa, there was at that time a group of people who had 
become destitute as a result of changing economic conditions. Iliffe (1987) classifies them as 
the “propertyless poor”. National government policies, however, catered for people who had 
no access to the labour market such as children, elderly people and those with disabilities. 
These were the “deserving poor”. There were, however, a growing number of South Africans 
who did have access to the labour market but remained poor in other aspects such as property 
and were unemployed. Overall, South Africa‟s underdevelopment was becoming increasingly 
visible both because of job scarcity and because of the poor in urban areas. Moreover, it also 
became apparent that the economy could not function solely on the basis of a few skilled 
white people (Van der Berg, 1989:203). Thus, at the dawn of the new democracy, South 
Africa found itself an inequitable country. 
 
4.6 Post-apartheid system   
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Out of apartheid South Africa there emerged two nations; one disfigured by poverty and 
unemployment while the other‟s per capita income was readily comparable to developed 
countries. Poverty and affluence lived side by side. The new South Africa continues to be 
divided along racial lines, where poverty is synonymous with race albeit decreasingly so. 
South Africa is one of the most unequal nations in the world; accordingly, its income 
inequality in 1993 was a Gini coefficient of 0.68 the highest ever recorded. In 2008, the Gini 
coefficient was 0.59 (Van der Berg, 1997; Leibbrandt, Woolard, Finn and Argent, 2010). 
This changing dynamic in inequality is attributed to the rising per capita black income; 
however, this is offset by the increasing inequality between the poorest of Africans and the 
most affluent of them (Van der Berg and Louw, 2004:568–589). The increasing inequality 
between members of the same race shows that inequality is becoming more intra-racially 
defined than between races. The Gini coefficient was highest in Africans, 0.51 and lowest in 
Whites, 0.36 meaning the level of inequality between Africans was higher than the level of 
inequality between whites (Leibbrandt et al, 2010:16). 
 
Poverty, inequality and the labour market are linked in South Africa because of the apartheid 
government‟s use of the labour market as a tool to establish separate development. While 
apartheid perpetuated income poverty by protecting the privileged position of whites through 
job reservation and relatively high wages, democratic South Africa‟s labour legislation did 
little to challenge this construct but protected the employed insiders through social insurance 
(Seekings, 2007a). The post-apartheid system stopped awarding affluence based on colour 
but based on skill, there were, however, structural changes in the South African economy and 
the global economies that also perpetuated such a position. 
 
… but in deracialising the legislation that formerly protected the privileges of an elite 
of white workers, the state introducing legislation that would ensure privileges for an 
elite of post apartheid workers, whatever race or skin colour (Seekings 2007b:23) 
 
This meant that African insiders joined in the privilege position of whites, while African 
outsiders were, and continue to be, marginalised because of lack of skills and geographic 
location (Van der Berg, 1997:483). The removal of racial constraints in the labour market has 
contributed to the upward mobility of African people and the increasing intra-racial 
inequality between some urban Africans and those who are on the outside (Seekings, 
2007b:12; Van der Berg, 1997). To be clear, the new democratic government did not 
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challenge the labour legislation construct that entrenched inequality in the apartheid era such 
as the accessibility of social insurance, instead, it extended the privileges of the previous 
system to all races.  
 
Figure 4.3 below looks at racial trends in income earnings as a percentage of the white level 
at the dawn of new democracy.  
 
Figure 4.3: Relative per capita personal income by race as a percentage of white levels 
 
Source: Leibbrandt, Woolard and Bhorat (2001) 
  
The figure shows the evolution of personal income as a percentage of white levels right up 
until the post-apartheid period in South Africa. For the Asian
26
 population, per capita income 
has shown a steady increase from 1970s; in 1995, it was 48.4% of the white level, which is 
the highest of all groups. The coloured population has also experienced some form of 
increase since the 1970s, which signalled a boom period and a reluctant change in labour 
laws in South Africa, although it seems to stagnate around 20% of relative white income even 
post apartheid.  
 
Table 4.2 demonstrates that there are still great income disparities between the races, 
reflected by the currently relatively high Gini coefficient. Africans still had the lowest 
earnings in 2008 compared to the other racial groups. The average income of the white group 
was seven times that of Africans. Although the mean per capita income was low for Africans 
in 2008, the majority of people earned far less. 
                                                 
26
 Asian population group in this context is both Indian and individuals of Orient descendent..  
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Table 4.10: Income overview by race at 2008 prices 
 1993 1993 2000 2000 2008 2008 
 mean median mean median mean median 
African 539 304 762 360 816 367 
Coloured 1072 795 1443 816 1318 800 
Indian 2148 1430 2625 1536 4288 1860 
White 4632 3418 6005 4170 6275 4188 
All 1147 419 1349 453 1456 450 
Source: Leibbrandt et al (2009:77)  
 
Thus, in South Africa there is currently a labour market that is still divided by skills where 
the majority of participants are low skilled; with this skills difference being exacerbated by an 
ineffective education system.  
 
4.6.1 Unemployment 
 
Poverty in South Africa is critically linked to income inequality, which in turn is linked to the 
labour market. In 1994, 10.3 million (of whom 10.2 million were Africans) South Africans 
lived in households that did not have anyone participating in the labour force, either formally 
or informally (South Africa, 2002a:70). Unemployment has continued to be on the increase 
post apartheid. Hodge (2009) attributes the stubborn unemployment trend to the growth of the 
labour force in excess of jobs created, that is, the labour force has grown faster than the 
number of job opportunities.  
 
In 2008, the narrow unemployment rate in South Africa was 24.4%; decomposing this rate by 
income decile shows that it was highest in the low income deciles. In 1993, this rate was 
49.1% and it increased to 69.4% in 2008 in the bottom decile. At the same time, 
unemployment rates became progressively lower in the high earning income deciles.  
 
Figure 4.4: Unemployment rates by income decile 
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Source: Own graph using figures in Leibbrandt et al (2010:32) 
 
The benefits in the formal labour system are structured such that they benefit those who are 
formally employed and who earn above a certain threshold. There is a comprehensive social 
insurance system that insures those who are employed although the unemployment insurance 
component is limited (Van der Berg, 1997). Both the social retirement insurance and the 
social assistance were modelled and instituted for whites, with Africans gradually being 
added on. Although the social insurance system was extended to Africans, most of them were 
involved in informal employment, which was not covered by social insurance, or were 
unemployed (Van der Berg, 1997:486). Under the apartheid social system, the UIF was 
designed to take care of the very few whites who were unemployed; however, when it was 
also gradually extended to Africans, it captured more people than the social insurance system 
(Van der Berg, 1997). The one form of social insurance that was designed for the 
unemployed was based on the fact that whites rarely experienced structural unemployment.   
 
The current unemployment benefit scheme is short term. Employer and employee each 
contribute 1% of the employee‟s earnings to UIF and this amount is capped is at R12 478 per 
month so the maximum contribution is R124.78 per month even if the employee earns more 
(Van der Berg and Siebrits, 2010:3). UIF is available at one day for every six days worked 
and a person can claim for up to a maximum of 238 days in a period of four years. The 
payouts range from 68% of contribution for a low income earner to 38% of contribution for 
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high income earners. Nonetheless, this system was not designed to handle long-term 
unemployment. The inability to handle the current levels of unemployment is due to the 
structural nature of South African unemployment, meaning unemployment exists because of 
the mismatch between the available skills and the kind of work available. At present the 
nature of coverage against unemployment leaves a major gap in the South African social 
security system, but any system capable of eliminating this gap would be very expensive, 
given the high level of unemployment in SA. 
 
4.7 The current social assistance system 
 
In 2009/10, nominal government spending on social grants was projected at 3.5% of GDP 
(National Treasury 2010:106). Table 4.3 illustrates the nominal social expenditure by type of 
grant; the greatest expenditure going to the OAP grant and then the CSG. The OAP was the 
largest grant by expenditure at 37%. The CSG‟s growth rate throughout the years has been 
14%, while that of the OAP has been 11%. The fastest growing grants of those presented in 
table 4.3 was the uptake of the foster care grant (15%) (National Treasury, 2010:106). 
Although the CSG amount is far less than the OAP (table 4.4), spending on the CSG is 
closing the gap with the OAP. This is because the number of beneficiaries of the CSG has 
increased throughout the years (table 4.5). Currently, the CSG has over nine million 
beneficiaries, making it the largest grant in terms of numbers of beneficiaries. In the 2009/10 
financial year it constituted 68% of beneficiaries.  
 
Table 4.11: Social expenditure by type of grant, 2006/07–2009/10 (million rands) 
Social grant  2006/07 2007/08 2008/10 2009/10 
Old age grant 21222 22801 25934 29991 
War veteran grant 25 22 20 18 
Disability grant 14261 15280 16474 16853 
Foster care grant 2851 1132 1292 1356 
Care dependency grant 1006 1132 1292 1356 
Child support grant  17559 19625 22248 27273 
Source: National Treasury (2010:106) 
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Table 4.12: Social grant amount by type of grant in rands, 2005–2010 
Social grant  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Old age grant 780 820 870 940 1010 1080 
War veteran grant 798 838 890 960 1030 1100 
Disability grant 780 820 870 940 1010 1080 
Foster care grant 560 590 620 650 680 680 
Care dependency grant 780 820 870 940 1010 1080 
Child support grant  180 190 200 215 240 250 
Source: National Treasury (2007; 2008; 2009; 2010) 
 
Table 4.13: Social grant beneficiary numbers by type of grant, 2005–2010 
Beneficiaries of social assistance grants  
Grant  Number of beneficiaries  
 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
Old age grant  2144117 2195018 2218993 2343995 2534082 
War veteran's grant  2832 2340 1963 1599 1248 
Disability grant 1319536 1422808 1413263 1371712 1310761 
Foster Care grant 312614 400503 443191 476394 569215 
Care Dependency Grant 94263 98631 101836 107065 119307 
Child Support Grant  7044901 7863841 8195524 8765354 9424281 
Total 10918263 11983141 12374770 13066118 13958894 
Source: National Treasury (2010:105) 
 
The OAP and the CSG warrant closer analysis for various reasons and thus the focus of the 
dissertation is the impact of these two grants on poverty. Firstly, the OAP is the biggest grant 
in terms of government expenditure and it is also a far larger amount than the CSG – R1080 
compared to R250 in 2010.  
 
The payout of the child support grant usually increases by R10 each year; it was R210 in 
2009. Both the OAP and the disability grant amounted to R940 in value. However, the grants 
do not always keep abreast of inflation (Pauw and Mncube, 2007). 
 
Although the current social assistance system is redistributive and reaches many of the poor, 
mainly through the OAP and the CSG, it still remains inadequate (Samson, 2002; Meth, 
2008, South Africa, 2002b). To address this, the government regards the Expanded Public 
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Works Programme (EPWP) as an important intervention to partially fill the gap (Siebrits and 
Van der Berg, 2010). Most adults (87%) and children (76%) live in households that do not 
have a pensioner (Samson, 2002:71). It is therefore important that these households have 
access to other forms of social assistance such as the EPWP. The BIG also is another option 
that has been considered; however, it has been rejected by the government on the grounds 
that it is a form of poverty alleviation.  
 
4.8 Conclusion 
 
Conclusions to be drawn from the critique of the apartheid social assistance system are that 
there existed some form of welfare system for all races despite the discriminatory levels. 
Although Africans, Indians and coloureds received pensions, health services and education, 
there was a huge difference in the quality of the services received. It took approximately sixty 
years for South Africa‟s welfare system to achieve parity, which happened in 1993; however, 
in the final years of apartheid, the state accelerated expenditure on other races while letting 
that on whites decline. Even though it was marred by the politics of segregation, the social 
system managed to redistribute income through social welfare. Furthermore, the issue of 
increasing poverty and unemployment in the country led to the debate on the introduction of 
a universal grant. However, the South African system remained rooted in the view that only 
those who cannot obtain labour-market income should qualify for grants. Therefore, as 
unemployment grew from the 1970s onwards, growing numbers of the poor did not qualify 
for social assistance. Accordingly, although the social assistance system is very large 
compared to those of other middle-income countries, it is still incomplete in the sense that a 
very large vulnerable group (the long-term unemployed) cannot access assistance. It is 
against this background that the controversial issue of universal grants has arisen. 
 
The above arguments put forth strong cases either advocating or opposing the institution of 
the BIG. The fact remains that the BIG would require vast resources and it depends on policy 
makers and budgetary commitments whether South Africa could commit to it. Thus, the 
government has decided to expand the public works programme, which gives citizens access 
to employment albeit only in the short run. 
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5. The impact of the social grants on poverty 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 4 highlighted the current state of social assistance in South Africa. At present, the 
government‟s antipoverty strategy depends on social grants alongside its public works 
programmes. The role of grants is therefore pivotal in poverty alleviation, as highlighted by 
Van der Berg and Siebrits (2010). With government currently experiencing fiscal stress 
owing to the global recession, all of government spending has come under pressure and there 
is thus a need to justify the role of social grants as an antipoverty strategy. The two main 
grants which are the focus of this dissertation, for reasons already explained in chapter 4, are 
the CSG and the OAP. However, it important to discuss the broader impact of grants before 
launching into a discussion on the CSG and the OAP. The purpose this serves is that it gives 
a holistic picture of the impact of social grants as, in light of the fiscal stress, it is important to 
show that the social grant system in its entirety is effective and not just the OAP and CSG.   
 
The sources of data analysis used in this section mainly comes from the IES 2005, the GHS 
2002-2007, these sources were also the data set used for secondary data used in this analysis. 
Section 5.2 measures the impact of social grant income in comparison with other sources of 
income. In essence this section answers the research question, while the sections that follow 
5.2 expound on the impact of social grants on poverty. Section 5.2 also discusses the impact 
of social grants on the incidence, depth and severity of poverty while a quintile analysis 
decomposes these results into income distribution. Section 5.3 then launches into a 
descriptive analysis of the characteristics of the CSG and OAP individuals and households. 
As with the descriptive section of chapter 3, the descriptive analysis is carried out in order to 
investigate whether these two grants are well targeted and also to alert us to developing 
trends in such households: that is, the impact of social grants on the labour market. The 
reported hunger incidence discussed in section 5.4 expands on the targeting of the grants. 
Here hunger is used as a crude measure of poverty to show that grant income not only 
reaches the recipient but also the entire household, which is a prediction of the unitary 
household model.
27
 In section 5.5, the development effects of the social grants on individuals 
                                                 
27
 Although this has no implications for the equitability of the distribution, the collective bargaining models 
would argue that the identity of the recipient of transfer augments resource distribution. 
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are also explained using both the unitary and collective bargaining models. The section also 
discusses the effects of grants on the labour market and on fertility.  
 
5.2 Income impact of social grants 
 
Income alleviates poverty. Armstrong and Burger (2009) use marginal effects analysis
28
 on 
IES 2005 data to compare the level, depth and severity of poverty against what would have 
prevailed if a source of income did not exist. The advantage of this method is that it 
circumvents the problem of simply measuring the mean impact of the source of income in 
alleviating poverty. Mean income is not able to capture the distributive effects that these 
sources have in this regard, and averaging would not show the impact that those income 
sources have on lifting or shifting individuals and families closer to or above the poverty line 
(Armstrong and Burger, 2009). Because income alleviates poverty, all forms of income have 
a reducing effect on poverty, although some sources of income have a greater impact on 
poverty alleviation than others (table 5.1). Wages, which account for 71% share of income, 
have the greatest effect on poverty, as they decrease poverty by 35%, whereas social grants, 
whose income share is 9%, decreased poverty by 4.7%.  
 
It should be noted from table 5.1 that, as the sensitivity of poverty measures increased, so did 
the relative impact of smaller sources of income, such as the social grants, on the incidence of 
poverty. The relative impact of social grants on the depth of poverty was 23% and severity 
was 27%. Even though the impact of wages still remained relatively higher than other forms 
of income, social grants made a substantial contribution compared to their impact on 
headcount. This means that social grants are effective in reducing the severity and depth of 
poverty by pushing individuals closer to the poverty lines relative to their share of income.  
 
The point that smaller proportions of income contributed substantially in the alleviation of 
poverty relative to their income share is illustrated when relative effect on poverty of income 
source is divided by the relative size of income source expressed as elasticity measure. The 
social grants are the most efficiently targeted and, given their proportion of income, they also 
have the greatest impact on poverty. A rand spent on social grants is six times more effective 
                                                 
28
 Armstrong and Burger(2009) adapt the methodology used by Duclos and Araah (2006) of measuring  the 
levels of poverty that would have prevailed in the absence of a certain type of income.  
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than a rand that is earned in the labour market (Armstrong and Burger, 2009:11). The relative 
contribution of each component to poverty is also reported in table 5.1. 
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Table 5.14: Decomposing poverty by income sources 
Absolute contribution 
to poverty 
Relative contribution to 
poverty 
Elasticity of Poverty to 1% change 
in income components 
 income share  α = 0 α = 1 α = 2 α = 0 α = 1 α = 2 α = 0 α = 1 α = 2 
Wages 71% –0.354 –0.414 –0.42 71% 55% 50% 1.00 0.77 0.7 
Self-employment/ 
employed 
11% –0.041 –0.056 –0.06 8% 7% 7% 0.76 0.69 0.67 
Rent and royalties  1% –0.004 –0.006 –0.01 1% 1% 1% 0.63 58% 58% 
Social grants 7% –0.047 –0.176 –0.23 9% 23% 27% 1.42 3.51 4.09 
Allowances 3% –0.017 –0.021 –0.02 3% 3% 3% 1.12 0.93 0.88 
Remittances 2% –0.012 –0.037 –0.05 3% 5% 5% 1.41 2.74 3.09 
Other 5% –0.021 –0.046 –0.06 4% 6% 7% 0.82 1.18 1.36 
 100%    100% 100% 100% 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Source: Armstrong and Burger (2009).
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However, the impact of grants on poverty does depend on where we draw the poverty line; 
Armstrong and Burger (2009:12) show the impact of grants at different poverty lines (table 
5.2). As expected the impact of the grants on poverty decreases the higher the poverty line is, 
almost negligible (2%) at the R7116 (2000 prices) per annum poverty line. The impact of 
grants on poverty is greatest at the R2532 (2000 prices) poverty line, where poverty was 
reduced by 13.8%, showing that the social grants were effective in reaching individuals in 
severe poverty who are low-earning individuals. This illustrates that smaller income sources, 
such as the grants, are effective in lifting lower-earning individuals towards or closer to the 
poverty line. Although larger income components still have a greater overall influence on 
poverty alleviation, smaller components are often more effective in pushing lower-earning 
individuals towards or closer to the poverty line. This section illustrates that this is the case 
for social grants, especially relative to their share in overall income. 
 
Table5.15: The effects of social grants on headcount poverty at different poverty lines 
(%) 
Poverty lines at (2000) prices 
 R 2 532 R 3 864 R 7 116 
Before social grants 45.5%  55% 66.7% 
After social grants 32.6% 47.3% 65.3% 
Difference –13.8% –07.7% –02.4% 
Source: Armstrong and Burger (2009)  
 
Armstrong et al (2008) used the same technique, at the R3864 poverty line, to show that 15% 
of people were lifted out of poverty. They warn, however, that these results are only 
indicative on the basis of relative poverty lines; where the reduction rate of poverty depends 
on the line used. They also make a strong labour market assumption: that the social grants 
have no labour market effects, meaning an individual would not base their labour market 
participation on ability to access grants.  
 
The preceding analysis shows that grants are effective in lifting people out of severe and deep 
poverty, which implies that the grants are well targeted. Quintile analysis, such as the one 
carried out below, is useful for showing the percentages of households in each income group 
that relies on social grants. There would seem to be a trend of decreasing reliance on grants at 
higher levels of income distribution (table 5.3). Households in the lower quintiles rely more 
on the social grants as sources of income than in the higher quintiles. Accordingly, from 2002 
to 2007, there has been an upward trend of reliance on the social grants by households in the 
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lowest two quintiles. It would seem that the social grants are well targeted in reaching the 
poorest 40%, although the numbers and the extent of impact differ between the two quintiles. 
In 2006, in total, 30.4% of households in South Africa had the grants as their main source of 
income. This corresponds with Armstrong and Burger‟s (2009) finding that the social grants 
are sufficient to lift many households out of the poorest quintile.  
 
Table 5.16: Percentage of households reporting grants as their main source of income 
by quintile 
Quintile 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
1 16.1 16.9 21.4 39.6 47.7 
2 31.4 36.1 44 49.5 51 
3 31.1 34 42.2 38.1 34.5 
4 18.1 19.5 16.7 14.3 16.0 
5 4.4 4.2 3.5 2.8 2.5 
Total 18.2 19.6 21.5 28.9 30.4 
Source: Leibbrandt et al (2010:61) 
 
To decompose these findings further, table 5.4 below shows that individual and household 
beneficiaries of the CSG and the OAP were mainly concentrated in the lowest quintiles. In 
the lowest quintile, there was a greater share of households reporting any income from the 
CSG than was the case for the OAP, which shows that OAP households are concentrated in 
the second and third quintile. This is a good indication that the OAP lifts people out of severe 
poverty, although the relative amounts of the two grants play an important role, with the OAP 
being three to four times the size of the CSG (Leibbrandt et al, 2010:61). Armstrong and 
Burger (2009) obtained similar results, showing that grants are effective in bringing people 
closer or over the poverty line. Households that reported any income from the CSG are 
mostly concentrated in the first and second quintile, consequently, they are the 40% who are 
in severe poverty.  
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Table 5.17: Percentage of households reporting income from social grants by quintile 
Quintile % reporting any 
income from child 
support grants 
% reporting any income 
from the old age pension 
1 55.8 9.8% 
2 57.9% 27.1% 
3 45.4% 23.5% 
4 26.5% 17.7% 
5 9.0% 5% 
all 33.6% 15.3% 
Source: Leibbrandt et al (2010:61) 
 
The analysis in this section means individuals were still poor, as they were still below the 
poverty line, but not as severely poor as they would have been in the absence of the grant. 
Hence, the social grants, as a source of income, are effective in reducing the depth and 
severity of poverty. 
  
5.3 Bivariate analysis  
 
The preceding section shows that grants have an impact on poverty. The following analysis is 
intended to create an understanding of households that contain grant recipients; in doing so, a 
broader and more comprehensive picture will be painted of the kind of households that 
receive grants. For instance, this section discusses the targeting of social grants by 
government.  
 
5.3.1 The Child Support Grant  
 
5.3.1.1  Person level analysis 
 
Nearly 60% of CSG beneficiaries
29
 come from the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and 
Limpopo, which are the poorest of the provinces and have a strong rural dimension 
associated with poverty (see table 1 in the appendix). According to the 2007 GHS these 
provinces together make up 51.2% of South Africa‟s population. In the two years that the 
“Area type” of the recipient was reported, two-thirds of the beneficiaries lived in rural areas. 
While there was little difference in the gender of the beneficiaries, there was an 
                                                 
29
 Where beneficiaries are the children receiving the grant and recipients are the caregivers that receive the 
grant on behalf of the children. 
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overwhelming race element. More than 94% of grant recipients were African children, 
followed by coloured children, who make up 5% of grant recipients. These percentages 
remain relatively unchanged through the years. In 2003, 36% of the children who received 
the grant were reported to be attending an educational institution at the time of the survey; 
this had doubled to 65% by 2007. The grant has been gradually expanded to include children 
of school-going age. 
 
5.3.1.2   CSG receiving household s 
 
Poor households have a high proportion of children under the age of eighteen; poor 
households comprised 65.5% children compared to 42.5% adults (Streak, Yu and van der 
Berg, 2008:15). It is also true that most household that received the CSG had a high 
proportion of children (Delany, Ismail, Graham and Ramkissoon, 2008:21). Although the 
CSG is targeted at children, it is receive by an adult caregiver. This has implications for the 
intended outcomes of targeting and whether a child benefits, as this depends on the household 
decision-making structure. If the household conforms to the unitary model, then the grant will 
reach the child equally along with other members of the family (Barrientos and Dejong, 
2006). The challenge with the CSG is the fact that the modest amount is based on the needs 
of the child, but a child cannot be singled out as he or she lives in a household. Therefore, 
how the grant reaches the child depends on the household decision-making structure. 
Although the grant is intended for the child, it is impossible to determine the intra-household 
allocation of resources. This becomes even harder when the collective decision model is used 
as an analytical framework, where the bargaining power lies in the amount of income and the 
recipient‟s ability to influence resource allocation decisions in the household. A child does 
not have the degree of bargaining power that adults have in a household, thus the gender of 
the primary caregiver receiving the cash transfer for the child has become important. Duflo 
(2003) and Delany et al (2008) show that cash transfers are used to take care of essentials in 
the home, such as food, fuel for cooking and clothing. This has created interest in how 
unconditional cash transfers are used within households given that there is no policing of how 
they are spent. 
 
The impact of an unconditional cash transfer can be difficult to measure and policymakers 
look for different things. Educators may look at school attendance and performance, while 
health officials may be looking for nutritional indicators such as height-weight ratio for a 
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particular age. Consequently, the same grant can be successful in terms of one indicator and 
fail in terms of another. The effectiveness of targeted conditional grants, like those found in 
Latin America, is easier to measure. The objectives of the Familia Escola in Brazil are to end 
child labour and have children go to school, while Progresa in Mexico is targeted at health 
and education. This trend is similar for other Latin American countries. Thus school 
attendance rates, clinic visits, and height and weight for age all measure the effectiveness of 
such programmes.  
 
The challenge with the CSG is that the targets are broad, simply to “follow the child”, yet 
even so, it is comparable to the Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) of Latin America. Even 
when applying these indicators, it has been proven that the CSG has an impact on poverty. 
While there is an absent counterfactual of how effective the programme might be if there 
were conditions attached to it. The CSG is effective even though there is no conditionality 
attached for continued receipt of the grant. 
 
5.3.1.3  Demographic profile and household head characteristics
30
 
 
As was found in the person level analysis, households with at least one CSG beneficiary are 
found mainly in the rural provinces of Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape. There 
is also a strong rural areas dimension to the receipt of CSG, with 60% of beneficiaries living 
in the rural areas in 2004. In 2007 households which had a grant recipient were slightly 
bigger in size (5.58) than households that did not receive the grant (4.61), with most grant 
recipients living in two- or three-generation households. Two-generation households could be 
made up of the parent and child or in some instances the child and grandparent as a primary 
caregiver. This is not surprising; given the spread of HIV/Aids in the working population 
some grandparents are left to care for their grandchildren. Of these two-generation 
households, 57% were headed by women and 42% by men. The high proportion of African 
households receiving CSG is consistent with the findings at the person level. The majority of 
these households (94%) are headed by an African and 6% are headed by a coloured. 
Furthermore, more than 85% of these households were headed by a person who had less than 
a matric qualification. However, it is worthwhile noting that a growing proportion of 
households that receive the CSG are headed by someone with a matric (from 6.5% in 2002 to 
                                                 
30
  Table 2in the appendix  
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approximately 10% in 2007), implying that this qualification is not enough to keep people out 
of poverty.  
 
5.3.1.4. Living conditions of households with at least one eligible member
31
 
 
Section 3.6 illustrates that the poor often lack access to basic services such as water, 
sanitation and energy and their living conditions are unsatisfactory. The purpose of a non-
money metric analysis in this section is to assess the reach of the CSG. We are interested in 
knowing if the grant has been able to reach the kind of households described as poor in 
section 3.6.  CSG-receiving households have a higher average number of persons per room 
(1.84) than those where there is no CSG beneficiary (1.37). A large number of these 
households rely on public taps to access water, whereas 55% of households that do not 
receive the CSG have their own piped water in the home. Sanitation remains a big challenge 
for these CSG-receiving households; 63% of them do not have access to a flush or chemical 
toilet for sanitation. Electricity and solar energy are used as a form of fuel for cooking by 
49% of the CSG households. The third most common source of energy for cooking is 
firewood. In 2002, many children came from homes that used wood for cooking; this has 
changed drastically – in 2007 49% of these households used electricity for cooking – this 
shows an improvement in access to electricity by CSG-receiving households. When it comes 
to refuse removal, 49% have their own refuse dump and 41% have their refuse removed at 
least once a week. Although these are relatively high proportions, this analysis broadly 
corresponds to the poverty analysis in chapter 3, which showed the lack of access to basic 
goods usually experienced by the poor. However, these results show that the CSG is being 
accessed by the poorest household.  
 
5.3.1.5. Household income and expenditure
32
 
 
Of the households that received the CSG, 42% are dependent on social grants as their main 
source of income followed closely by households that receive salaries or wages. These salary-
receiving households use the CSG to supplement household income. Only 11% of households 
which had remittances as their main source of income reported receiving the CSG. A third of 
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 Table 5  in the appendix  
32
 Table 6  in the appendix  
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these households live on less than R1200 a month. Much of the income of these households 
depends on the labour participation of household heads.    
 
Figure 5.1 below shows that it was households with lower labour participation of household 
heads that received the CSG by broad employment status.
33
 Slightly over a third of CSG 
beneficiaries came from households headed by an employed individual; this proportion is 
above 50% throughout the years where there is no grant beneficiary. The mean number of 
employed in grant-receiving households is lower compared to the mean in households that do 
not receive the grant. The mean number of employed people is 0.74 for households that 
received the grant and 1.16 where there is no grant beneficiary.  
 
Figure 5.5: Proportion of eligible children receiving CSG by broad employment status 
of household head 
 
Source: Own calculations using GHS 2002–2007 
 
 
                                                 
33
 Statistics South Africa uses two definitions of unemployment, namely a strict (official) definition and broad 
definition. The strictly unemployed are working age people who did not work during seven days prior to the 
interview but would want to work and are actively looking for work or start some form of self employment in a 
month prior to the interview. The broad unemployment definition excludes those who are actively looking for 
work in the four weeks; these are often called discouraged workers.  
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5.3.1.6. Labour force participation rate (LFPR) in CSG households  
 
Figure 5.2 points to the fact that unemployment rates for households that do not receive the 
CSG is lower than those households who receive the CSG. The labour force participation rate 
for working age individuals in households that receive CSG is 60%, compared to 67% of 
those who did not receive the CSG in 2007. The participation rate for males and females in 
CSG-receiving households does not differ much at roughly 60% (see figure 5.3 and figure5. 
4). However, the participation rate of males in households that do not receive the CSG is 72% 
and 62% for females. In addition, there is higher participation in the labour force for 
households that do not receive the CSG. The difficulty with interpreting these numbers is the 
suggestive causality between labour market participation and the CSG. There are two 
plausible reasons for such an observation: It could be that households that have unemployed 
individuals pass the means test and therefore receive the CSG; alternatively it could be that 
the availability of the grant enables individuals to stay at home. Since 2005, the white 
participation rate has been on a steady decline, whereas African and coloureds have remained 
within the same margins. Coloured households that do not receive the CSG still have high 
levels of labour participation rates.  
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Figure 5.6: Broad labour force participation rates and unemployment rate of the 
working-age population by the CSG acceptance status of the households that contain 
eligible children 
 
Source: Own calculations using GHS 2002–2007 
 
The overall unemployment rate for CSG-receiving households has declined from 61% in 
2002 to 57% in 2007 (see figure 5.2). It should be noted from figure 5.2 that both kinds of 
households that had an eligible grant beneficiary experienced a gradual decline in 
unemployment. The unemployment rate for males in households that had a grant recipient 
was much higher compared to males in households with no grant recipient (see figure 5.3). A 
similar trend is found with females. Females in CSG-receiving households have the highest 
unemployment rates compared to males in CSG household and females in households where 
there are no grant recipients, almost 70% in 2003. The highest unemployment rate was 
among African-headed households – 58% in 2007 – and white households had the lowest. 
For households that did not receive the CSG, whites had the lowest unemployment rate. 
Thus, in general, for the working age population in households that receive the CSG, the 
LFPR is lower and the unemployment rate is higher (see figures 5.3 and 5.4). 
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 Figure 5.7: Broad labour force participation rates and unemployment rate of the male 
working-age population, by the CSG acceptance status of the households that contain 
eligible children 
 
Source: Own calculations using GHS 2002–2007 
 
Figure 5.8: Broad labour force participation rates and unemployment rate of the female 
working-age population, by the CSG acceptance status of the households that contain 
eligible children 
 
Source: Own calculations using GHS 2002–2007 
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5.3.2 The old age pension 
 
5.3.2.1  Selected person-level analysis of old age pension recipients 
 
The OAP is one of the biggest social grants in the country, the main beneficiaries of which, in 
both 2002 and 2007, were females. One reason for the greater proportion of females receiving 
the OAP is because the eligibility age for females (60 years) is set lower than males (65 
years). The Department of Social Services has since equalised the eligibility age and the 
eligibility age for men is being reduced stepwise from 65 to 60 – it is currently 63. In 2002 
and 2007, there was also a strong racial dimension in the group that received the OAP; in 
2007, most of the OAP recipients were African (79.5%). The white population group which 
was the next biggest group to receive the OAP was just under 10% in 2007. Note that the 
proportion of white elderly people receiving the grant has shown a gradual increase.  
 
Table 5.18: Selected person-level characteristics of old age pension receiving individuals 
(%) 
Selected old age pension characteristics  2002 2007 
Person-level characteristics 
Gender 
Male  27.12 29.43 
Female 72.88 70.57 
Population group 
African 81.89 79.5 
Coloured 7.68 7.73 
Indian 2.57 3.15 
White 7.85 9.62 
Source: GHS 2002; 2007 
 
5.3.2.2  Characteristics of households head in OAP-receiving households. 
 
The headship of a household has implications for the distribution of resources in that 
household. Literature on the OAP has highlighted that the OAP benefits more than just the 
recipient in the households which it enters.
34
 OAP-receiving households are predominately 
headed by a female (table 5.6). In both 2002 and 2007, most of these household heads were 
also African. The main source of income in the households was the OAP, which is not 
surprising as a majority of these heads have no schooling and are no longer part of the labour 
                                                 
34
 Section 5.5 discusses the labour market implications of the OAP in detail.  
102 
 
force. These characteristics seem to infer that most of these household heads are elderly 
people. The headship of elderly people has increased; from 71.2% in 2002 to 74.3% in 2007. 
Headship has implications for the way resources are distributed in the household. The unitary 
model maintains that the income would not change the distribution of resources; however, 
this is not the case. Spending by elderly people improves the distribution between members 
of the household; moreover, the OAP has been known to favour children.  
 
Table 5.19: Selected household head characteristics of OAP-receiving household (%) 
Gender of household head (%) 
Male 40.9 39.9 
Female 59.0 60.1 
Population group of household head (%) 
Black 87.3 86.7 
Coloured 6.8 7.1 
Indian 1.8 2.1 
White 4.1 4.0 
Income source of household head (%) 
Salaries/wages 22.9 23.0 
Remittances 2.8 2.7 
Social grants 72.3 74.1 
Household head’s level of education (%) 
No schooling 46.5 44.9 
Incomplete primary 26.7 26.9 
Incomplete secondary 20.93 22.02 
Household head’s employment status (%) 
Not part of labour force 83.64 87.92 
Employed 13.95 9.78 
Unemployed 2.42 2.3 
Age of household head (%) 
45–54 years 4.3 3.8 
55–64 years 18.96 17.88 
65+ years 71.23 74.31 
Source: GHS 2002, 2007 
 
Households that have an OAP recipient are on average larger in size than households that do 
not. There is also higher proportion of three-generation households where there is an OAP 
recipient (see table 5.7). Duflo (2003) shows that the elderly people usually lived with their 
grandchildren. Accordingly, there are fewer elderly people that received the OAP and live by 
themselves (6.9%) compared to elderly people who do not receive the OAP and live by 
themselves (28.3%). This confirms that there is clustering around the OAP and household 
sizes are larger where there is an OAP recipient (Duflo, 2003). On average, where there was a 
pension recipient, there were fewer working age adults. This finding neither confirms nor 
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disproves the discourse on the impact of the OAP on prime aged individuals. Much of the 
interpretation the OAP has to do with how a household is defined. Bertrand et al (2003) and 
Posel et al (2004) find different outcomes for the impact of grants on the working age 
population.
35
 
 
Table 5.20: Household size where there is an OAP-eligible recipient 2007 
 Received OAP Did not receive OAP 
Mean 
Std dev 
6.48 
3.17 
5.09 
3.38 
One-generation household (%) 
Two-generation household (%) 
Three-generation household (%) 
6.88 
33.02 
57.39 
28.38 
34.15 
36.28 
Number of working age adult 
Std dev 
0.67 
 0.99 
 
1.18 
1.05 
 
Source: GHS 2002, 2007 
 
5.3.2.3  Employment status and labour participation in OAP households  
 
This section describes the relationship between OAP-receiving households and the labour 
market, bearing in mind that there are various definitions of household membership
36
. For 
both 2002 and 2007, the GHS illustrates that a great proportion of prime-aged members of the 
household where there is an OAP recipients are not part of the labour force – 58.7% and 
62.6% respectively (table 5.8). The proportion of unemployed individuals living with OAP 
recipients has decreased since 2002, with mostly females who are not part of the labour force 
living in OAP households (table 5.9). Where there is an unemployed individual in an OAP 
household, it is usually unemployed males (23.5%) compared to unemployed females 
(20.1%). With substantially high proportions of prime-aged individuals living with OAP 
recipients, where the main source of income is the social grants and the household size is 
relatively larger than non-grant receiving households, it is small wonder that most of these 
households are likely to be plunged into poverty. The analysis on reported hunger in section 
5.4 will expand   understanding of the impact of social grants on poverty.  
                                                 
35
 This is further analysed in labour market effects of grants (section 5.5.2). 
36
 See application to section 5.4 where Edmunds et al (2005) and Betrand et al (2003) found different results 
on the labour market impact of OAP due to the definition of household membership. The challenges of 
defining membership are also discussed in chapter 2 
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Table 5.21: Broad employment status of prime-aged individuals in OAP-receiving 
households (%) 
status 2002 2007 
Not part of the labour force 58.67 62.57 
Employed 15.35 15.91 
Unemployed 25.98 21.51 
Total 100 100 
Source: GHS 2002, 2007 
 
Table 5.22: Broad employment status of prime-aged individuals in OAP-receiving 
households in 2007 by gender (%) 
status female male 
Not part of labour force 66.79 56.64 
Employed 13.09 19.88 
Unemployed 20.12 23.48 
Total 100 100 
Source: GHS 2007 
 
5.4 Hunger variable analysis  
 
Although both the CSG and the OAP are unconditional grants, there is evidence that they are 
used as regular income within household (Duflo, 2003). Between 2003 and 2007, there was a 
decrease in the number of reported always hungry incidences in children where there was a 
CSG recipient. There was also a greater number of grant-receiving children who report never 
feeling hungry (78.2%) compared to grant-receiving children in other hunger categories in 
2007 (table 5.10). This shows that the CSG has had some impact in reducing the frequency of 
reported hunger for CSG-receiving children.  Note that children who report always feeling 
hungry amounted to less than 1% in 2007. The CSG has made considerable progress in 
reaching vulnerable children in poor households when comparing the two years. 
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     Table 5.123: Reported child hunger in CSG and non-CSG-receiving households 
.   Source: GHS 2002, 2007 
 
  Eligible age +  Eligible age +  
Received CSG Did NOT receive CSG 
 GHS GHS GHS GHS GHS GHS GHS GHS GHS GHS 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Never 56.50% 64.40% 67.10% 76.90% 78.20% 69.00% 72.70% 77.20% 84.70% 87.10% 
Seldom 7.70% 6.60% 6.00% 3.30% 3.70% 5.00% 5.10% 4.20% 2.90% 2.10% 
Sometimes 24.50% 22.30% 20.10% 16.40% 15.70% 18.40% 16.40% 13.70% 10.20% 8.70% 
Often 6.80% 4.30% 3.80% 2.00% 1.50% 4.50% 3.50% 2.70% 1.40% 1.30% 
Always 4.50% 2.40% 3.00% 1.40% 1.00% 3.10% 2.30% 2.30% 0.90% 0.70% 
  100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
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Figure 5.9: Reported hunger for CSG-eligible children 
 
Source: own calculations using GHS 2002, 2007 
 
The CSG results and the OAP results for reported child hunger show similarities (figure 5.6). 
In 2002, almost 60% of children in OAP-receiving households reported never going hungry 
as opposed to 81.79% in 2007. Those that reported that they were sometimes hungry declined 
by 12%. The OAP thus seems to have had a greater impact on child hunger than the CSG 
when comparing the sets of figures. There are at least two possible reasons for this: Firstly, 
the size of the OAP far exceeds the CSG, therefore the OAP can reach more individuals than 
the CSG. Secondly, elderly people are usually household heads in OAP-receiving households 
and therefore there is a more altruistic distribution of resources that favours children more 
than in households where the head is younger. The altruism of pension recipients is also 
illustrated by the decreasing reported hunger of adults who live in OAP households (figure 
5.7). Here the percentages are similar to those of children in OAP households. Pensioners 
have more scope to assist the entire family because the OAP is far larger than the CSG. 
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Figure 5.10: Reported child hunger for children in OAP-receiving households 
  
Source: Own calculations using GHS 2002, 2007 
 
Figure 5.11: Reported adult hunger in OAP-receiving households 
  
Source: own calculations using GHS 2002, 2007. 
 
5.5 Development effects  
 
5.5.1 The effects of social grants on the labour market 
 
Opinion is divided on the incentive effects of the social grants on labour supply in South 
Africa (Edmonds et al, 2001; Bertrand et al, 2003; Posel et al, 2004; Klasen and Woolard, 
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200). Edmonds et al (2001) studied the effects of large cash transfers on household 
composition in African households. They found different effects in households headed by 
women and by men, with a greater number of children and fewer working age women in 
female-headed household than in male-headed households.  
 
Bertrand et al (2003) found that there was a negative correlation between looking for work 
and prime-aged individuals within households where there was an OAP grant recipient. 
Kingdon and Knight (2000) also found that the reservation wage
37
 of some individuals 
(predominantly males) increased due to the lack of pressure to work and therefore prolonging 
the search for employment. Klasen and Woolard (2005) examined how unemployment 
persisted without formal state support for the unemployed, especially with South Africa‟s 
high rate of unemployment in the rural areas. It was found that the unemployed survived by 
attaching themselves to a household that had a working individual or grant recipient. They 
also found that prime-aged
38
 individuals moved in with people who received the OAP, 
putting a strain on the household resources and pulling the whole household into poverty. 
These coping strategies negatively influenced search and employment prospects, as the 
location of economic support is often far away from promising labour market opportunities – 
these safety nets create regional immobility of the unemployed (Klasen and Woolard, 
2005:4). 
 
Klasen and Woolard (2005) and Bertrand et al (2003) argue that the social grant ends up 
supporting people whom it was not intended to support. The lack of economic support 
reduces a person‟s employment prospects, as they cannot work away from home due to the 
additional costs involved in job search (Klasen and Woolard, 2005:20). Although the effects 
of these coping strategies, that is, the unemployed attaching themselves to households whose 
resources are already strained, are problematic, they are understandable and represent a 
rational response to the incentive set. For Lund (2006), findings that suppose that prime-aged 
males are the unintended beneficiaries of the OAP, did not make economic sense. Given the 
current environment in South Africa of high unemployment and high job search costs, it 
seems less credible that these men would voluntarily leave the job market (Lund, 2006:172). 
 
                                                 
37
 The reservation wage is the wage that an individual would be willing to back to the labour market for. It is 
the wage that is greater than the opportunity cost of not working for the individual. 
38
 Prime-aged individuals being between 15 to 64 for men and 15 to 59 for women, 
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Table 5.11 shows that a great proportion of broadly unemployed individuals depend on the 
social grants as a main form of income. The table also shows that the majority of households 
with individuals who are not part of the labour force depend on social grants as a main source 
of income (41.7%).  However, the unemployed mainly attach themselves to households that 
received salaries and wages as a main source of income (40.3%), with 31.2% of this group 
living in households that still mainly depend on the social grants. The pension and other 
grants act as a safety net for individuals not participating in the labour market and those who 
are unemployed. The social grants have also allowed people to leave the household in search 
of work so the view that social grants encourage non-labour participation is not supported by 
Posel et al (2004) 
 
Table 5.24 Income source by income status (%) 
Main household income broad employment status  
Source Non participant employed unemployed Total 
     
Salaries/wages 37.71 86.91 40.3 56.68 
Remittances 13.57 1.61 18.92 10.45 
Social  grants 41.75 5.63 31.23 25.68 
Sales of farm product 0.86 1.33 0.81 1.02 
Other non-farm income 4.25 3.93 4.44 4.18 
No income 1.43 0.18 4.03 1.61 
Unspecified 0.43 0.41 0.26 0.38 
     
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Own calculations using GHS 2002-2007 
 
Posel et al (2004) investigated migrant labour and the household (mainly how the OAP 
affected the labour supply). They found that the OAP facilitated the ability of household 
members to look for employment away from home. These results were more prominent 
among women, who left home to go look for work away from the rural areas even though it 
was temporary employment. The OAP assisted by providing financial support for these 
individuals and provided for children who were often left with the grandmother during this 
time. 
 
Furthermore, Posel et al (2004) found no convincing evidence that prime-aged males who 
lived with old age pensioners do not actively seek employment – the results were robust. 
However, even if it were the case, Black (2004:419) argues that it is not rational to look for 
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employment if the probability of finding it was too low compared to the effort and costs 
involved in the search. This could explain the observed reluctance of the prime-aged male to 
look for work especially in rural areas (Klasen and Woolard, 2005). 
 
Survey evidence contradicts the notion that individuals in poor households prefer receiving 
grant income to working. Surender, Ntshongwana, Noble and Wright (2007) surveyed 
African communities in the Eastern Cape and Western Cape about attitudes regarding the 
CSG and the DG being used as general poverty grants. The results reveal that unemployed 
people said that there is dignity attached to working. Although the grants helped, they were 
not enough, especially the CSG, as the needs of the child increased. Parents struggled to meet 
school fees and buy uniforms and there were complaints that the CSG did not keep up with 
inflation. Contrary to the OAP assisting with transport costs for job employment, participants 
in this study said that the CSG amount was too little to assist in this regard.  
 
Consequently, like the OAP, the CSG affects household formation and decision making. It is 
possible to have more than one grant recipient in a household; however, this is not generic of 
all households. More often than not the grant money is the only source of income. Some 
respondents to the survey felt guilty about using the grant for the whole household when it is 
intended for a child, yet they admitted that they could not just take care of the child in 
isolation when there are other hungry people in the household. This is characteristic of the 
unitary household resource allocation model where the identity of the person receiving the 
transfer does not matter. In support of this, Rozensweig (1986) warns that individual targeted 
social programmes should be aware of household dynamics that may influence the 
effectiveness of the programme. 
 
5.5.2 Fertility effects  
 
There is a possibility that the CSG creates an incentive for increased fertility. There is 
evidence of an increase in teenage births between 1995 and 2005, with fertility increasing 
among girls in their late teens or early twenties (Department of Social Development, 2006). 
Young mothers may use the grant to gain financial independence from the household or 
affect resource allocation. In such a case, the collective model would argue that the identity 
of the recipient of the grant is relevant as it influences resource allocation.  
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However, there is counter evidence that only 5.3% of CSG mothers are young mothers in the 
group 15 to 19 years; this group accounted for only 18% of all mothers receiving grants in the 
2001. The grant amount has relatively small meaning that its availability hardly seems 
enough of a motivation to fall pregnant to access the grant (Department of Social 
Development, 2006). The increase in the grant uptake is said to have been mostly because of 
the increased awareness of the availability of it (Department of Social Development, 2006). 
Makiwane (2010) found no significant positive association between the grant and the trend in 
teenage childbearing. In all, there has been no concrete evidence to infer that the CSG 
influences fertility, especially because the grant amount is so small. There still needs to be 
research carried out on the impact of grants on such things as fertility before misguided 
policy intervention. Indeed, Makiwane (2010) warns that it is important to have a full 
understanding of the South African case before importing international policies to deal with 
local problems, as with the case of the grants. In the UK and the US, for example, there have 
been proposals to exclude teenage mothers from receiving social grants. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
Poverty grants are effective in reducing the incidence of poverty for households receiving the 
grants. A broad analysis of the grants was conducted in order to show the impact of the 
overall system on eradicating poverty. It was also found that the social grants have been well 
targeted, as the poorest 40% have the highest proportion of both CSG and OAP recipients. 
Although the poverty line used determines the incidence of poverty reductions, there was 
consistency in two of the poverty lines, with the finding that the incidence of poverty has 
been reduced.  
The in-depth bivariate analysis of the OAP and the CSG shows that when looked at 
individually, the grants reach households in categories that are labelled as markers of poverty, 
such as access to basic services. It was found that households that have limited access to 
these resources have access to the social grant. Moreover, although poverty cannot be 
measured by a simple variable such as hunger (this dimension of poverty was discussed in 
section 3), nevertheless the hunger variable in a way communicates the level of poverty 
experienced in households by both adults and children. Child poverty in both CSG- and 
OAP-receiving households was low in both 2002 and 2007, and adult poverty was also low in 
OAP-receiving households. The implications this has for decision making is that, in terms of 
the unitary framework, grants proportionally reach members of the household and are 
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regarded as ordinary income. However, where the collective and the unitary models differ is 
that in the collective model, the identity of the recipient matters. Consequently, this section 
has shown that children are favoured in OAP-receiving households because decision makers 
are predominantly elderly people.  
 
A number of debates still rage about the labour market effects of the grant, especially the 
ones examined. Subsequently, no concrete evidence has been found to motivate for whether 
grants have a negative or a positive effect on the labour market. The differing views depend 
much on the definition of the household. There is also no evidence to support claims that the 
CSG has increased fertility levels. However, there is still much we do not understand on the 
effects of grants on fertility owing to a lack of available data.  
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6. Conclusion and policy implications 
 
The extent to which the cash transferred to poor households via the grant programmes 
reduces poverty is likely to be influenced significantly by the decision-making structures in 
the grant-receiving households. There is evidence that grant money is shared in extended 
households, which suggests that decision making is broadly unitary or cooperative. However, 
we can only observe the outcomes and not the decision-making process in this regard and 
therefore can only draw tentative conclusions. 
 
There is evidence from the literature reviewed and the analysis carried out that the identity of 
the head is important in order for grants to become effective tools in poverty alleviation 
(Thomas, 1990:657; Duflo, 2003). It would also seem that the gender of the household head 
has a bearing on how resources are allocated in the household. Duflo (2003) found that 
women pensioners tended to allocate resources more altruistically than their male 
counterparts.  
 
The gender of the household head has implications for the labour market. Prime-aged males 
were less frequent in male-headed households, implying that male heads required the other 
men present in the household to work. There was also a greater share of women in these 
male-pensioner headed households (Bertrand et al, 1999). However, this is not the situation in 
female-headed households, as there is a greater share of unemployed prime-aged males in 
such households. This could be attributed to the altruistic nature of the grandmother as prime-
aged males report higher incidences of falling sick. Bertrand et al (1999) are of the view that 
social norms influence power within a household. Men have predominantly been the 
household heads in African households, thus they would still maintain their headship 
regardless of their employment status. In support of this, Bertrand et al (1999:29) found that 
men had stronger intra-household bargaining power than women and also that men were less 
altruistic than women, meaning that male heads had no tolerance for fellow unemployed men. 
These researchers found that pension transfers to female elderly people reduced employment 
more than transfers to male elderly pensioners.  
 
However, Posel et al (2004) draw different conclusions about the impact of a pension-
receiving elderly person on the labour supply. For poor people, unearned income enables 
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members to move away from rural areas in search for job opportunities in urban areas to 
militate against risk of not finding employment. It is the reallocation of resources in a 
cooperative household that enables individuals to move away for job search, augmenting 
future resources that will come into the home. The unitary model fails to explain this 
household dynamic, but the model is successful in explaining the altruistic household head 
who redistributes resources equitably keeping prime-aged individuals from work (Bertrand et 
al, 1999). There is no evidence to show that grants, especially the CSG, increase fertility 
rates.  
 
Although there is cause for concern regarding the propensity of social grants to affect 
people‟s behaviour negatively, there is a case to be made for retaining grants as an important, 
though not the only, form of anti-poverty strategy.  This highlights the need for continued 
research on the labour market and the social grants causal relationship. It also shows that 
research into the fertility effects of the grants is wanting, especially if there are speculative 
concerns that might inform policy on the impact of CSG on fertility. In times of fiscal stress, 
the analysis above has proven that grants are worthwhile, though limited, policy instruments.  
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8. Appendix 
 
Table 1: Person level characteristics of CSG age eligible beneficiaries 
 
 
 
 
  
 Eligible age + received CSG Eligible age + did NOT receive CSG 
 GHS 
2003 
GHS 
2004 
GHS 
2005 
GHS 
2006 
GHS 
2007 
GHS 
2003 
GHS 
2004 
GHS 
2005 
GHS 
2006 
GHS 
2007 
Province 
Western Cape 8.1% 6.1% 5.4% 5.2% 5.4% 9.8% 10.2% 10.9% 11.5% 12.0% 
Eastern Cape 15.1% 16.1% 19.7% 21.2% 19.3% 16.1% 19.1% 15.3% 13.8% 12.8% 
Northern Cape 1.0% 1.8% 1.7% 1.6% 2.1% 2.2% 2.1% 2.0% 2.2% 2.8% 
Free State 6.9% 6.7% 7.0% 6.6% 6.6% 4.9% 5.4% 5.4% 5.7% 5.8% 
KwaZulu-
Natal 17.0% 18.4% 20.2% 19.7% 21.7% 22.9% 22.2% 22.2% 21.5% 21.5% 
North West 9.4% 10.2% 8.0% 8.2% 8.2% 8.3% 7.3% 8.0% 7.4% 6.1% 
Gauteng 11.9% 10.6% 10.7% 10.9% 11.0% 18.3% 17.7% 17.8% 19.3% 21.8% 
Mpumalanga 10.6% 9.2% 8.9% 9.2% 9.8% 6.3% 6.0% 6.6% 6.4% 6.2% 
Limpopo 20.2% 20.8% 18.3% 17.3% 15.9% 11.3% 10.0% 11.8% 12.3% 10.9% 
 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
Area type 
Urban 38.5% 36.4% n/a n/a n/a 50.9% 52.0% n/a n/a n/a 
Rural 61.5% 63.6% n/a n/a n/a 49.1% 48.0% n/a n/a n/a 
 
100.0
% 
100.0
% n/a n/a 
n/a 100.0
% 
100.0
% n/a n/a 
n/a 
Gender 
Male 50.0% 51.7% 52.0% 51.3% 50.8% 51.0% 52.8% 52.5% 52.4% 52.4% 
Female 50.0% 48.3% 48.0% 48.7% 49.2% 49.0% 47.2% 47.5% 47.6% 47.7% 
 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
Race 
Black 94.4% 94.1% 94.1% 94.4% 94.1% 78.5% 75.9% 77.2% 76.0% 74.0% 
Coloured 5.3% 5.6% 5.2% 4.9% 5.4% 10.2% 10.7% 10.6% 11.3% 12.2% 
Indian 0.2% 0.3% 0.6% 0.6% 0.3% 2.4% 2.7% 2.8% 2.7% 3.2% 
White 0.2% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 9.0% 10.7% 9.4% 10.0% 10.7% 
 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
Attendance at educational institution at the time of survey 
Yes 36.7% 49.0% 58.8% 62.6% 64.5% 46.5% 57.3% 68.7% 66.8% 65.9% 
No 63.3% 51.0% 41.2% 37.4% 35.5% 53.5% 42.7% 31.3% 33.2% 34.1% 
 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
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Table 2 household characteristics of CSG age eligible beneficiaries 
 
 Eligible age + received CSG Eligible age + did NOT receive CSG 
 GHS 
2003 
GHS 
2004 
GHS 
2005 
GHS 
2006 
GHS 
2007 
GHS 
2003 
GHS 
2004 
GHS 
2005 
GHS 
2006 
GHS 
2007 
Household size 
Mean 6.53 6.46 6.47 6.29 6.34 6.16 6.23 5.97 5.78 5.90 
Std Dev. 2.77 2.76 2.79 2.67 2.78 2.84 3.07 2.62 2.50 2.76 
Gender of household head 
Male 44.1% 42.5% 44.1% 42.6% 42.2% 56.9% 57.6% 56.7% 57.0% 58.1% 
Female 55.9% 57.5% 55.9% 57.4% 57.9% 43.1% 42.4% 43.3% 43.0% 41.9% 
 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
Race of household head 
Black 94.5% 94.0% 94.2% 94.4% 94.2% 78.6% 75.9% 77.1% 76.1% 73.9% 
Coloured 5.2% 5.7% 5.1% 4.8% 5.3% 10.0% 10.7% 10.5% 11.0% 11.9% 
Indian 0.2% 0.3% 0.5% 0.7% 0.3% 2.4% 2.7% 2.8% 2.8% 3.2% 
White 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 9.0% 10.7% 9.6% 10.1% 10.9% 
 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
Highest educational attainment of household head 
No schooling 26.5% 26.5% 25.8% 26.2% 24.9% 20.4% 20.0% 19.9% 17.2% 15.4% 
Incomplete 
prim. 
27.3% 27.6% 27.4% 26.2% 
24.7% 
21.7% 21.7% 20.4% 19.2% 
17.9% 
Incomplete sec. 38.4% 36.6% 37.1% 38.4% 41.0% 35.8% 32.2% 32.8% 34.8% 34.5% 
Matric 6.1% 7.7% 8.2% 8.0% 8.0% 13.5% 14.6% 15.7% 18.0% 18.9% 
Matric + 
Cert/Dip 
1.2% 1.3% 1.3% 0.8% 
1.2% 
3.7% 6.3% 6.5% 6.1% 
7.6% 
Degree 0.6% 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 4.9% 5.3% 4.7% 4.8% 5.8% 
 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
Marital status of household head 
Married 57.3% 55.1% 52.9% 52.3% 50.9% 64.7% 64.5% 62.9% 63.6% 65.1% 
Widow/Widowe
r 
22.9% 23.4% 23.6% 22.4% 
22.4% 
19.1% 19.6% 18.3% 16.3% 
16.5% 
Divorced/ 
Separated 
4.5% 5.2% 4.8% 4.2% 
3.6% 
4.2% 4.3% 4.2% 3.9% 
4.2% 
Unmarried 15.2% 16.3% 18.7% 21.1% 23.1% 12.1% 11.6% 14.6% 16.2% 14.3% 
 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
Age of household head 
Under 18 years 0.1% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.5% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.3% 
18-24 years 2.2% 3.0% 2.4% 2.6% 2.6% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.5% 2.5% 
25-34 years 16.7% 16.1% 18.7% 17.9% 16.1% 20.2% 19.4% 17.9% 18.4% 16.9% 
35-44 years 24.7% 24.1% 23.7% 24.4% 24.7% 28.8% 27.7% 29.6% 30.0% 30.5% 
45-54 years 21.0% 21.2% 21.7% 21.0% 20.9% 18.7% 19.1% 21.2% 21.2% 22.4% 
55-64 years 17.4% 17.9% 15.8% 15.7% 16.6% 14.3% 15.0% 14.2% 13.7% 14.3% 
65+ years 17.9% 17.5% 17.4% 18.2% 18.6% 15.7% 16.3% 14.5% 13.6% 13.2% 
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100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
Number of generations in the household 
One 3.1% 3.0% 3.5% 3.5% 3.8% 2.7% 2.5% 3.9% 4.0% 3.6% 
Two 49.7% 52.0% 54.1% 55.5% 53.7% 60.5% 61.0% 62.5% 64.9% 64.2% 
Three 46.3% 44.2% 41.5% 40.3% 41.5% 36.4% 36.1% 32.8% 30.6% 31.2% 
Four/Five 0.9% 0.8% 0.9% 0.7% 1.0% 0.4% 0.5% 0.9% 0.5% 0.9% 
 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
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Table 3 Percentage of eligible children receiving CSG by household characteristics 
 
 GHS2003 GHS2004 GHS2005 GHS2006 GHS2007 
Gender of household head 
Male 26.6% 37.4% 40.4% 45.1% 43.4% 
Female 27.4% 38.4% 40.9% 46.2% 59.3% 
Race of household head 
Black 30.8% 43.0% 45.5% 51.1% 57.4% 
Coloured 16.0% 24.1% 25.0% 26.6% 31.9% 
Indian 2.3% 5.8% 12.6% 16.6% 10.0% 
White 0.8% 0.3% 0.8% 0.8% 2.0% 
Highest educational attainment of household head 
No schooling 32.4% 44.6% 47.0% 56.1% 63.3% 
Incomplete prim. 31.8% 43.6% 47.9% 53.5% 59.5% 
Incomplete sec. 28.4% 40.9% 43.6% 48.1% 55.8% 
Matric 14.2% 24.3% 26.3% 27.2% 31.1% 
Matric + Cert/Dip 10.6% 11.1% 12.2% 10.3% 14.6% 
Degree 4.0% 3.4% 2.9% 5.4% 2.6% 
Marital status of household head 
Married 24.7% 34.2% 36.5% 40.8% 45.3% 
Widow/Widower 30.8% 42.1% 46.8% 53.6% 59.0% 
Divorced/Separated 28.4% 42.7% 43.7% 47.7% 47.8% 
Unmarried 31.9% 46.1% 46.8% 52.2% 63.0% 
Age of household head 
Under 18 years 9.9% 37.2% 23.7% 27.3% 65.5% 
18-24 years 28.0% 45.7% 43.0% 46.5% 52.2% 
25-34 years 23.4% 33.6% 41.7% 45.0% 50.2% 
35-44 years 24.1% 34.6% 35.4% 40.6% 46.1% 
45-54 years 29.4% 40.3% 41.2% 45.4% 49.7% 
55-64 years 31.1% 42.0% 43.3% 49.0% 55.1% 
65+ years 29.8% 39.5% 45.1% 52.9% 59.8% 
Number of generations in the household 
One 29.7% 41.7% 38.2% 42.3% 52.4% 
Two 23.3% 34.2% 37.2% 41.8% 46.9% 
Three 32.0% 42.7% 46.4% 52.5% 58.4% 
Four/Five 45.2% 51.7% 40.9% 52.8% 53.3% 
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Table 4 Labour market characteristics of the recipients and non-recipients of CSG 
 
 Eligible age + received CSG Eligible age + did NOT receive CSG 
 GHS 
2003 
GHS 
2004 
GHS 
2005 
GHS 
2006 
GHS 
2007 
GHS 
2003 
GHS 
2004 
GHS 
2005 
GHS 
2006 
GHS 
2007 
Broad employment status of household head 
Not part of LF 41.5% 41.0% 41.9% 41.5% 42.0% 32.8% 34.5% 32.1% 31.0% 28.8% 
Employed 35.9% 36.0% 35.8% 36.2% 37.4% 52.0% 52.7% 54.6% 55.8% 60.1% 
Unemployed 22.6% 23.0% 22.4% 22.3% 20.7% 15.2% 12.8% 13.3% 13.2% 11.2% 
 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
Number of employed in the household 
Mean 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.69 0.74 0.95 1.00 1.03 1.04 1.16 
Std Dev. 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.88 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.96 
Number of narrow unemployed in the household 
Mean 0.63 0.58 0.60 0.59 0.54 0.51 0.50 0.41 0.45 0.41 
Std Dev. 0.99 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.94 1.00 0.79 0.90 0.83 
Number of broad unemployed in the household 
Mean 1.28 1.22 1.18 1.08 1.04 1.00 0.96 0.82 0.79 0.73 
Std Dev. 1.29 1.22 1.18 1.10 1.13 1.21 1.32 1.09 1.06 1.03 
 
 
Table 5 Living conditions of grant recipients  
 
 Eligible age + received CSG Eligible age + did NOT receive CSG 
 GHS 
2003 
GHS 
2004 
GHS 
2005 
GHS 
2006 
GHS 
2007 
GHS 
2003 
GHS 
2004 
GHS 
2005 
GHS 
2006 
GHS 
2007 
Dwelling type
#
 
Formal 67.2% 64.0% 60.1% 63.8% 63.0% 72.5% 70.9% 71.1% 76.2% 76.2% 
Informal 32.8% 36.0% 40.0% 36.2% 37.0% 27.5% 29.1% 28.9% 23.8% 23.8% 
 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
Number of persons per room (Excluding bathrooms and toilet) 
Mean 1.94 1.90 2.05 1.96 1.99 1.75 1.70 1.71 1.64 1.68 
Std Dev. 1.28 1.31 1.41 1.40 1.38 1.25 1.32 1.28 1.29 1.35 
Water access 
Piped (Tap) 
water  
in dwelling 
15.9% 14.4% 15.9% 16.6% 18.8% 35.5% 37.6% 39.4% 42.6% 46.3% 
Piper (Tap) 
water  
on site or in 
yard 
31.9% 33.1% 31.6% 32.7% 32.4% 24.3% 22.9% 23.9% 25.0% 25.0% 
Public tap 24.6% 23.0% 25.1% 24.9% 26.4% 16.0% 15.9% 16.8% 14.9% 13.6% 
Others 27.6% 29.4% 27.4% 25.8% 22.4% 24.2% 23.6% 20.0% 17.5% 15.1% 
 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
Sanitation 
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Flush/Chemica
l toilet 
31.1% 29.1% 31.1% 30.9% 33.5% 47.2% 49.2% 52.8% 55.9% 60.0% 
Pit latrine with 
/ without 
ventilation 
49.9% 53.5% 51.4% 52.8% 52.1% 39.4% 37.1% 35.5% 35.1% 32.2% 
Bucket 
toilet/None 
19.0% 17.4% 17.5% 16.3% 14.4% 13.4% 13.7% 11.8% 9.0% 7.9% 
 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
Fuel for cooking 
Electricity/Sol
ar 
33.8% 35.2% 37.4% 41.1% 
46.0% 
51.7% 53.9% 57.5% 63.2% 
67.4% 
Paraffin 17.4% 17.5% 18.5% 17.2% 14.2% 12.9% 12.3% 12.3% 10.8% 8.5% 
Wood 41.6% 41.2% 36.6% 34.5% 33.2% 30.0% 29.0% 24.6% 21.0% 19.0% 
Others/None 7.2% 6.2% 7.5% 7.3% 6.7% 5.4% 4.9% 5.6% 5.1% 5.1% 
 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
Refuse removal 
Removed at 
least once a 
week 
34.7% 32.8% 35.7% 35.6% 36.6% 48.0% 49.5% 53.3% 56.9% 60.3% 
Removed less 
than once a 
week 
0.7% 1.6% 1.4% 1.3% 1.7% 1.2% 1.5% 1.2% 1.5% 0.9% 
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Table 6 Household income and expenditure information by CSG acceptance status 
 
Contain at least 1 member in eligible age +  
at least 1 member received CSG 
Contain at least 1 member in eligible age +  
no one received CSG 
 
GHS 
2002 
GHS 
2003 
GHS 
2004 
GHS 
2005 
GHS 
2006 
GHS 
2007 
GHS 
2002 
GHS 
2003 
GHS 
2004 
GHS 
2005 
GHS 
2006 
GHS 
2007 
Main income source of household 
Salaries/Wages 37.6% 35.8% 35.9% 37.0% 38.5% 41.7% 59.8% 61.3% 62.8% 68.5% 69.5% 75.0% 
Remittances 17.3% 19.2% 18.7% 13.4% 12.4% 11.8% 14.1% 14.2% 12.0% 10.4% 9.4% 7.7% 
Pensions/Grants 37.4% 36.6% 38.0% 43.4% 44.0% 42.0% 18.1% 17.9% 18.4% 14.9% 16.3% 12.9% 
Sales of farm products 1.4% 1.1% 0.9% 0.9% 1.4% 1.1% 1.0% 0.7% 1.0% 0.8% 1.0% 1.0% 
Other non-farm income 5.0% 6.2% 6.1% 4.5% 2.8% 2.6% 5.1% 4.1% 4.8% 3.7% 2.4% 1.8% 
No income 1.2% 1.2% 0.4% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 1.9% 1.9% 0.9% 1.7% 1.4% 1.6% 
 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Monthly household expenditure (Rand, nominal values) 
R0-R399 37.2% 31.3% 21.6% 23.3% 22.0% 13.6% 27.6% 21.5% 12.8% 11.7% 10.0% 7.2% 
R400-R799 38.2% 38.1% 39.6% 39.5% 40.0% 37.4% 30.8% 27.7% 24.3% 21.7% 21.7% 18.0% 
R800-R1199 12.5% 17.6% 20.0% 19.0% 21.5% 25.1% 13.5% 15.3% 13.8% 13.0% 15.8% 14.0% 
R1200-R1799 6.7% 6.6% 10.4% 10.1% 9.1% 13.8% 7.8% 8.9% 11.8% 12.2% 12.7% 12.8% 
R1800-R2499 2.7% 3.5% 4.6% 4.5% 3.9% 5.4% 5.8% 6.2% 8.4% 9.1% 9.2% 10.0% 
R2500-R4999 2.2% 2.4% 3.2% 2.8% 2.9% 3.9% 7.6% 9.9% 14.6% 16.7% 14.5% 17.5% 
R5000-R9999 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.8% 0.5% 0.6% 4.8% 7.0% 10.0% 10.8% 10.9% 13.9% 
R10000+ 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 2.1% 3.5% 4.2% 4.8% 5.2% 6.7% 
 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
 
